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On Instructing Deadlocked Juries
In the summer of 1965, Thomas F. Murphy, a capable but crusty
federal judge in the Southern District of New York, was presiding at
the trial of a revenue agent for accepting bribes.' The trial was not
long, nor the issues complex, and in the mind of Judge Murphy the
case was a simple one.2 But a minority of the jurors thought otherwise,
and after three and a half hours in the jury room, they sent a message
that they were "hopelessly deadlocked." Judge Murphy called them in
and, following his usual practice on such occasions, delivered to them
a quotation, slightly modified, from the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Allen v. United States3 a case decided in 1896. The jury recom-
menced deliberations and promptly returned a verdict of guilty. The
Court of Appeals upheld the verdict by only "the barest margin"; there
would have been error, the court said, had an unmodified Allen charge
been given.4
One suspects that Judge Murphy was surprised.5 His charge to the
jury was of the type known as a "supplementary instruction"-given
when the jury appears to be deadlocked-and in both federal0 and
I. United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
2. Record at 347, cited in Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 32a, United States v.
Kenner, 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
3. 164 U.S. 492 (1896). Charges like Judge Murphy's, based on the language of the
Allen case, are usually referred to as "Allen charges," although this is not strictly correct.
The instruction actually delivered in Allen was based on the charge of Hoar, J., approved
in the early case of Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851).
4. 354 F.2d at 784.
5. His certainty that the Allen charge was proper appears from the following colloquy
with counsel:
The Court: I have a note from the jury, which reads, "Jury hopelessly deadlocked.
No change in sight."
[Prosecutor]: I would request an Allen charge.
[Defense Counsel]: Oh, no, your Honor.
The Court: What do you mean no? I would give it to my mother.
[Defense Counsel]: That is highly questionable.
The Court: Take your exception, gentlemen, and bring the jury in.
Record at 380, cited in Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 47a, United States v. Kenner,
354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
6. E.g., criminal cases: Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
,denied, 387 U.S. 934 (1967); Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963); Kleven v.
United States, 240 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1957); Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562 (10th
Cir. 1947); United States v. Oweiss, 138 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 744(1944); Bord v. United States, 133 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 671 (1942);
Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934); Johnson v. United States, 5 F.2d 471
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state7 courts supplementary instructions have a long, if not always hon-
orable," history. The practice of giving supplementary instructions, al-
ready "familiar" in 1894, was approved by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Allis,9 and that case stands unmodified and apparently
unshaken.'0 The quotation from the Allen case on which Judge Mur-
phy's charge rested is not the only standard-form supplementary instruc-
tion, 1 but until recently it has been the most popular. For there the
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 574 (1925); Shaffman v. United States, 289 F. 370 (3d Cir.
1923); Suslak v. United States, 213 F. 913 (9th Cir. 1914); Shepard v. United States. 160 F.
584 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 571 (1908); Allis v. United States. 73 F. 165 (C.C.E.D.
Kan. 1893), cert. denied, 155 U.S. 117 (1894). But see Mendelson v. United States, 58 F.2d
532 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ("better to avoid .. . the practice of supplementary charges'); Peter-
son v. United States, 213 F. 920 (9th Cir. 1914).
Civil cases: Yount v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1963); John Fabrick
Tractor Co. v. Lizza & Sons, 298 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1962); Railway Express Agency v. Mackey,
181 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1950); Hoagland v. Chestnut Farms Dairy, 72 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir.
1934); Hill v. Wabash Ry., 1 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1924); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Allied
Mach. Co., 271 F. 900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 704 (19Z-); Boston & Me. RLR. v.
Stewart, 254 F. 14 (Ist Cir. 1918).
7. E.g., Garrett v. State, 171 Ark. 297, 284 SA.. 734 (1926); People v. Gidney, 10 Cal.
2d 188, 78 P.2d 1186 (1937); People v. Miles, 143 Cal. 636, 77 P. 666 (1901); Mills v. People,
146 Colo. 457, 862 P.2d 152 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 841 (1962); Sevilla v. People. 65
Colo. 437, 177 P. 135 (1918); State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 138 A.2d 786, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 46 (1958); Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943); Commonwealth v. Tucy.
62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851); People v. Fleisher, 322 Mich. 474, 34 N.W2d 15 (1948), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 980 (1949); State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 189 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 374
U.S. 855 (1968); Simmons v. State, 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W.2d 487 (1955). In Arizona and
Montana, charges based on Allen are forbidden, but it is not dear that the prohibition
extends to all supplementary instructions. State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P2d 197
(1959); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960).
8. E.g., Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 US. 672
(1918) (no error to tell jury that "the most stubborn thing on the face of this earth is
a jackass" and that "the United States might as well by special statute abolish the Court
of the Western District of Texas if juries are never to agree').
9. 155 U.S. 117, 123 (1894).
10. A capital conviction following the judge's somewhat modified version of the Allen
charge was approved in the case of Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), a
treason case marked by an exceedingly bitter squabble among the jurors, who deadlocked
for four days. See United States v. Kawakita, 190 F.2d 506, 521 n.17 (9th Cir. 1951). The
Supreme Court, moreover, has consistently denied certiorari to cases upholding supple-
mentary instructions, both before Kenner (Kahaner v. United States, 375 US. 836 (1963);
Andrews v. United States, 372 U.S. 946 (1963); Curcio v. United States, 364 U.S. 824 (1960))
and after (Rao v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 3133 (Oct. 15, 1968); Bilotti v. United States,
389 U.S. 944 (1967); Fulwood v. United States, 387 U.S. 934 (1967); Kenner v. United States,
388 U.S. 958 (1966)). The only recent exception is Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445
(1965), reo'g 380 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where the trial judge told the jury they "had got
to" agree, a flat misstatement of the law. See pp. 108-09 infra.
11. Also in common use are the charge delivered by Judge Walter H. Sanborn in United
States v. Allis, 73 F. 165 (8th Cir. 1893), and approved in Allis v. United States, 155 U.S.
117 (1894), and a blended version of both Allis and Allen delivered by Judge Mathes in
United States v. Kawakita, 96 F. Supp. 824, 855-57 (S.D. Cal. 1950), afj'd, 190 F.2d 506 (9th
Cir. 1951), 348 U.S. 717 (1952). The Kawakita charge is reprinted in Judge Mathes's
manuals on jury instructions for federal judges. 28 F.R.D. 401, 454-56 (1962); 27 F.R.D.
39, 102-04 (1961). It should be remembered that many judges fail to use standard.form
supplementary instructions. See note 18 infra.
Compare, too, the approved English supplementary instruction from Shoukatallie v.
The Queen, [1962] A.C. 81, 91:
He reminds them that it is most important that they should agree if it is possible to
do so: that, with a view to agreeing, they must inevitably take differing iews into
101
The Yale Law Journal
Supreme Court laid down the law in somber legal language calculated
to impress a wayward juror12:
[T]hat in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not
be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each
individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of
his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with
candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of
each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could
conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to
be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger
account; that if any member should find himself in a small minority and disposed to
differ from the rest, he should consider the matter carefully, weigh the reasons for
and against his view, and remember that he may be wrong; that if, on so doing, he
can honestly bring himself to come to a different view and thus to concur in the
view of the majority, he should do so, but if he cannot do so, consistently with the
oath he has taken, and he cannot bring the others round to his point of view, then
it is his duty to differ, and for want of agreement, there will be no verdict.
12. 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896). The quotation is the Supreme Court's paraphrase of the
instruction actually given; the Court went on to set out its own conception of the jurors'
duties.
While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each
individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by con-
ference in the juryroom. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by
a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly
cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments
and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury
taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that eachjuror should go to the jury-room with a blind determination that the verdict shall
represent his opinion of the case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to
the arguments of men who are equally honest and intelligent as himself.
Strictly speaking, the Allen case is authority only for the paraphrase In the first paragraph;
but courts have ignored the distinction by reading both paragraphs to deadlocked ,trlcs,
as Judge Murphy did in Kenner, supra note I. Orton v. United States, 221 F.2d 632 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955). Only the Eighth Circuit appears to have made a
serious effort to separate the Allen instruction from the Allen opinion, holdlnq that
quotation from the opinion constituted reversible error. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co. v. Sellars,
5 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1925); Nigro v, United States, 4 F.2d 781 (Sth Cir. 1925); Stewart v.
United States, 300 F. 769 (8th Cir. 1924). This position was not adopted by other circuits,
e.g., Dwyer v. United States, 17 F,2d 696 (2d Cir. 1927), and Its status even in the Eighth
Circuit is doubtful. Cf. Thompson v. Allen, 240 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1956). The whole matter
is made very fuzzy by the tendency of appellate courts not to quote exactly what the trial
judge said, and by the freedom with which homemade paraphrases of the Supreme Court's
language are upheld as Allen charges. Cf. note 18 infra. In any case, courts are obliged to
be careful about the language they use to justify an approved instruction, Compare Selden v.
United States, 16 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1926), where Learned Hand lashed out at juries that "set
at defiance law and reason," with Wissel v. United States, 22 F.2d 468 (2d Cr. 1927), where
the trial judge was reversed for telling a jury what Hand said they could not do.
A second problem with the Allen opinion is that the charge delivered, if it was in fact
the Tuey charge, included a reinstruction on burden of proof and presumption of in.
nocence. Although the Court's paraphrase omitted this portion of the Tuey charge, Chief
Judge Aldrich of the First Circuit has recently suggested that it was an "integral part of the
Allen charge, the leaven making it palatable." Pugliano v. United States, 848 F.2d 903
(1st Cir. 1965).
At one time, indeed, the Tenth Circuit required a reinstruction on burden of proof as
part of the Allen charge. See Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1951); Spcak
v. United States, 161 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1947); Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th
Cir. 1932). But this doctrine appears to have lapsed. DeVault v. United States, 838 F.2d 179
(10th Cir. 1964); Carter v. United States, 833 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1964).
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number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider
whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression
upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelli-
gent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might
not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not
concurred in by the majority.
Though upholding Judge Murphy, the Second Circuit now announced
that it had "grave doubts whether the charge as given was not unduly
coercive."u3
The Second Circuit does not stand alone in its doubts as to the Allen
charge.' 4 Hostility to the Allen charge has been growing for some time,15
apparently on the theory that the charge is a relic of an otherwise dis-
carded procedure.' 6 As Judge Brown said in Huffman v. United States: 7
13. 354 F.2d 780, 783-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1965). These doubts
seem to have been resolved in later cases, as the Second Circuit has upheld without
difficulty charges substantially the same as Judge Murphy's. United States v. Rao, 394 F.2d
354 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3133 (Oct. 15, 1968); United States v. Bilotti, 380
F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 944 (1968).
14. Two state courts have abandoned Allen entirely. State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342
P.2d 197 (1959); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P,2d 1054 (1960). Slight additions to
the Allen charge have led to reversal in United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348 (6th Cir.
1968); Williams v. United States, 838 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Smith,
803 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1961); and
United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961). Dissenting judges have urged that
the Allen charge be abandoned in Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22, 27 (5th Cir. 1965)
(Brown, J., dissenting); Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J..,
dissenting); Andrews v. United States, 809 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting);
Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting). And courts
upholding a modified Allen charge have criticized the charge unmodified in Burroughs
v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966), and Thaggard v. United States. 354 F.2d
735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966). Commentators tend to agree with the
criticisms. Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the "Allen
Charge," 31 U. Cm. L Rav. 386 (1964); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung
Jury: A Re-Examination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967). See also Astrmrc.'
BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON MLNtIttU STANDARDS FOR CRIMuNAI. JuSTIcE, TRIAL By JuRY 146.56
(Tent. Draft, 1968), suggesting the abandonment of the charge, and its replacement by a
statement of the jurors' duties in the charge-in-chief.
15. "Nor do we circulate the 'Allen charge' to the new judges as I used to do when
heading up the criminal division in the Department of Justice. Allen is dead and we do not
believe in dead law." Mr. Justice Clark in Clark, Progress of Project Effective Justice-A
Report on the Joint Committee, 47 J. Amt. Ju. Soc'y 88, 90 (1963). But hostility to Allen
may not extend to trial judges. In the Fifth Circuit, at least, both Judge Coleman and
Judge Wisdom believe its use is becoming more frequent. Thaggard v. United States, 354
F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965) (dissent), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); Andrews v. United
States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissent).
16. Judges are fond of citing Blackstone's remark that, if the jury failed to agree, they
-were locked up in a cart, without meat, drink, fire, or candle, and followed the judge
from town to town. Only a verdict could secure their release. Walker v. United States, 342
F2d 22, 28 (5th Cir. 1965) (Brown, J., dissenting); United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co.,
173 F.2d 506, 508 (2d Cir. 1949); Kramer v. Kister, 187 Pa. 227. 40 A. 1008 (1898). Jurors
might be fined if found with unauthorized victuals. P. DEvLIN, TRIAL BY JuRY 50-51 (1956)
reprints the following account of a search designed to ensure that jurors truly hungered
after justice:
The Jury being withdrawn after Evidence, and remaining a long Time without
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"The fact is that in many phases of criminal law we have come a long,
long way since 1896. There is no longer any place for the Allen charge."
The revolution in trial procedure worked in recent years by the Supreme
Court means that many judges now take sterner views of practices they
once condoned. Thus in 1960 District Judge Skelly Wright was routinely
delivering Allen charges in New Orleans.18 Only four years later, as a
circuit judge in the District of Columbia, he noted that the charge was
generally "condemned as a 'dynamite' charge" and cited with approval
cases restricting its use.19
In the minds of some, dislike of the Allen charge has spilled over into
a wholesale condemnation of supplementary instructions,20 a tendency
concluding on their Verdict, the Officers, who attended them, seeing their Delay,
searched them, and found that some had Figs and others had Pippins; which being
moved to the Court, they were examined on Oath, and two of them confessed that they
had eaten Figs before they were agreed on their Verdict, and three confessed that
they had Pippins, but had not eat any of them; and that this was unknown to the
Parties. Those who had eaten were each of them fined five Pounds, and those who
had not eaten the Pippins, were each of them fined forty Shillins; but the Verdict
was, upon great consideration, and Conference with the other Judges, held to be
good.
Nor have all Americans yet made a clear break with their ancestors' tradition. At least
one commentator maintains the view that it is unconstitutional to permit a jury to hang.
Icenogle, The Menace of the Hung Jury, 47 A.B.A.J. 280 (1961). And in 1941 in Wisconsin,
a trial judge was reversed for threatening to keep a jury overnight in an unheated room.
Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941).
17. 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissent).
18. See Silverman v. Travellers Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1960); Wilson v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 275 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1960).
19. Jenkins v. United States, 830 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissent). It is true that
Judge Wright had employed Allen in civil cases, and attacked it in a criminal one; yet his
criticisms are not limited to criminal cases.
20. I cannot see that the qualifications, reservations, and escape clauses customarily
used in modem versions of the [Allen] charge save it from being what it is, and what
the jury believes it to be, a direct appeal from the Bench for a verdict.
The real burden of what I am saying is that the essential meaning of Constitutionally
guaranteed trial by jury is that once the jury has retired to consider of its verdict It
should not be subjected to so much as the appearance of any influence from any
source for the purpose of producing a verdict. The jurors should be left to the
unhampered expression of their own consciences, independently arrived at.
Coleman, J., in Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739-41 (5th Cir. 1965) (dissent),
cert. denied, 883 U.S. 958 (1966). The author of Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and
the "Hung Jury": A Re-Examination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 129 (1967)
expresses the same view. Id. 148-49. In several cases, courts have suggested that it is the
delivery of the Allen charge as a supplementary instruction, not its statement of the law,
that renders it dangerous: delivered as part of the charge-in-chief, the coercive effect Is
minimized. Burrup v. United States, 371 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1967); Kent v. United States,
343 F.2d 247, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Janko v.
United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960); Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941). But other cases consider the charge as bad in the
original as in the supplementary instructions, Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1968); State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959), or suggest that the charge
is properly delivered only after a "reasonable time" or if the jury has reported disagree.
ment. United States v. Barnhill, 305 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962); United States v. Furlong, 191
F.2d I (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 950 (1952); Hill v. Wabash Ry. Co., 1 F.2d
626 (8th Cir. 1924). Cf. Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (dis.
senting opinion).
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aided by the confusing and inaccurate practice of calling almost any
supplementary instruction an "Allen charge."21 But most judges have
followed lines similar to those laid down by Judge Murphy: not all
supplementary instructions are bad,-- only those considered too "coer-
cive."a Yet the courts have failed to develop any coherent theory of
what makes a charge impermissibly "coercive." Most courts indulge in
more or less sophisticated question-begging-some glorying in purely
verbal distinctions, 24 others confining scrutiny to whether the charge is
"stronger" than some fixed standard.25 Still other courts indulge in an
21. "The designation of 'an Allen charge' has tended to become an over-simplification
since, as might be expected, the express words before the Supreme Court in the Allen case
have, in the intervening years, been frequently rearranged or altered, with resulting varia-
tions in emphasis or impact." Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 261 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
A good example of the prevailing confusion is the treatment of Judge Mathes's modified
Allen charge, reprinted at 27 F.R.D. 39, 102-04 (1961). In Strangway v. United States, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the delivery of Judge Mathes's charges, pointing out that it was
"substantially different" from the Allen charge. 312 F.2d 283, 286 nA (9th Cir. 1963). Yet in
Huffman v. United States, Judge Brown in dissent claimed that the popularity of the
Mathes charge only indicated the increasing use made of the Allen charge. 297 F-d 754,
759 (5th Cir. 1962).
22. "We fail to perceive, .. how criminal justice could be reasonably administered if
a jury had to be discharged the first moment it stated that its members could not agree."
United States v. Rosso, 58 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1932) (A. Hand, J.).
23. The propriety of an instruction such as we have under consideration must be
determined from whether it had a tendency to coerce the jurors in their deliberations
so that the verdict which they ultimately reached and returned into court was not
truly their own, but was brought about in part by coercion from the court.
Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562, 565 (10th Cir. 1947). For others among the very
numerous cases applying the language of coercion, see United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d433 (4th Cir. 1961); Thompson v. Allen, 240 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1956); Weathers v. United
States, 126 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1942); Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1932);
Shaffnan v. United States, 289 F. 370 (3d Cir. 1923); Peterson v. United States, 213 F. 920
(9th Cir. 1914).
24. Consider the doctrine of Wissel v. United States, 22 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1927), a case
often cited:
Pressure of whatever character, whether acting on the fears or hopes of the jury, if
so exerted as to overbear their volition without convincing their judgment, is a species
of restraint under which no valid judgment can be made to support a conviction.
No force should be used or threatened, and carried to such a degree that the juror's
discretion and judgment is overborne, resulting in either undue influence or coercion.
A judge may advise, and he may persuade, but he may not command, unduly influence,
or coerce.
Id. at 471. Other circuits allow "indoctrination," Carter v. United States, 333 F.2d 354(10th Cir. 1964), "assistance," Hill v. Wabash Ry., 1 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1924), or "guidance,"
United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962). Under such circumstances a prudent
trial judge will accept the urging of an appellate court that he stick to an approved
pattern instruction. See Fulwood v. United States 369 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Berger
v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1932); Stewart v. United States, 300 F. 769 (8th Cir.
1924).
25. The standard is usually the Allen charge itself, which has been held to be the
"outer boundary" to which a trial judge can go. Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1962); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Rogers,
289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961). In its most reasonable form, this doctrine is merely a none-too-
elegant method of begging the question. Instead of saying simply that a charge is "too
coercive," the court says, with exactly the same lack of analysis, that it is "stronger" than
the Allen charge and hence impermissible. E.g., Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735(5th Cir. 1965),(Coleman, J., dissenting); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.
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elaborate "balancing" process whose principal effect, if successful, is to
render the entire instruction pointless.
26
The difficulty in the courts' approaches is that the problem of the sup-
plementary instruction cannot be solved without reference to the goals of
the jury system. The framing of proper supplementary instructions de-
pends on a comprehension both of the nature and purposes of the una-
nimity rule and of the patterns of influence among jurors and between
juror and judge. The supplemental instruction then becomes but an
element in a more general model and a part of the broader question-
in what ways may the judge influence the jurors?
1962); United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962); Powell v. United States, 297
F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1961). At times, however, the doctrine becomes either ludicrous or con-
fusing or both. Exegesis of the differences between a given charge and the Allen model may
take the form of a line-by-line comparison of the two, as in Huffman v. United States,
297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962), where Judge Brown compiled a list of 13 particulars where
the charge as given differed from the Allen charge. 297 ?.2d at 757-58. But such comparisons
are meaningless if, as tends to be the case, no reasoning is provided to explain why one
phrase is acceptable and the other is not. Still odder are cases like Jenkins v. United States,
330 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where the D.C. Circuit was so mesmerized by the belief that
the Allen charge alone was the enemy that it devoted much of an opinion to demonstrating
that a complained-of charge was not Allen. Ignored entirely was a flat misstatement of the
law, on which the Supreme Court later relied in reversing: the trial judge had told the
jury that they had "got to agree." Jenkins v. United States, 880 U.S. 445 (1965).
Even apart from the anomalies of a case like Jenkins, the rule that the Allen charge is
the outer boundary of the trial judge's discretion is of questionable validity. The decision
in Rogers v. United States, supra, whence the doctrine sprang, is a good example of the
ingenious disingenuity with which judges sometimes change the law. The court began
with the notion that Brasfield v. United States, 272 US. 448 (1926), stood for the proposi-
tion that inquiry into the division of the jury combined with an Allen charge required
reversal. In fact, it is clear that the Supreme Court in Braspield was quite indifferent to
the presence of an Allen charge: though one was delivered, the Supreme Court's opinion
does not mention it. Rather, the opinion goes off on the supposed invariable harm resulting
from the judge's asking how the jury was divided. 272 U.S. at 450. See p. 133 inlra.
Having "established" this premise, the Rogers court then made good use of the forty
years of criticism that have been heaped on the inflexible Brasfield rule. See note 97 infra.
Armed with such criticism, and with its own belief that an inquiry into the jury's division
was but a "trifling addition" to the impact of the Allen charge, 289 F.2d at 436, the court
in Rogers was able to complete the elegant syllogism it had mapped out. If Brasfield held
that inquiry plus the Allen charge yielded reversal, and if inquiry was a trifling matter,
then surely a judge who delivered an Allen charge was teetering on the brink of reversal.
26. The required "balancing" is between urgings to agreement and urgings not to
surrender conscientious convictions. Elbel v. United States, 864 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966);
Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1964); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eustler, 276
F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960); Thompson v. Allen, 240 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1956); Bord v. United
States, 133 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir., 1942); Weathers v. United States, 126 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.
1942); State v. Doan, 225 Minn. 193, 30 N.W.2d 539 (1947).
This approach is open to the objection that it perceives jury deliberation as a one-
dimensional continuum: at one extreme, each juror abides by his "conscientious convic-
tions" and ignores the majority; at the other, "conscientious convictions" are "sur-
rendered" under pressure from the majority. The job of the judge framing supplementary
instructions is to make sure the jury moves in neither direction along the continuum;
he must neither add to the strength of the majority, nor intensify the convictions of the
minority. But if the judge's instruction balances exhortations to conscience and to unity
equally, it is hard to see why any instruction at all should be given. For the most efficient
way to make nothing happen is to do nothing.
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I. The Persuasion of Jurors
"The distinctive strength and safeguard of the jury system," writes
Professor Kalven of the Chicago Jury Project, "is that the jury operates
as a group." 27 The jury would be a very different institution were jurors
placed in isolation booths to rely alone on whatever "conscientious con-
victions" they acquire at the trial. Instead, jurors of different convic-
tions, different values, and different perceptions of the facts must sit
down together in the same room and attempt to reach consensus on a
verdict, Except in the rare cases where all jurors agree at the outset of
the deliberations, this will mean that out of the variety of points of view
with which the jurors start, one must win. Hence analysis of jury de-
liberations is, by and large, the study of the means by which jurors are
persuaded.
In the traditional view, persuasion of jurors is seen primarily as a
process of rational argument, not very different from a controversy in
the learned journals.2 One side advances a proposition; the other side
either challenges the underlying premise, or accepts the premise but
denies that the proposition follows. The content of arguments is all-
important: a position is not abandoned because it is attacked (even if at-
tacked by many people); it is abandoned only if shown to be illogical or
based on a false premise. From the point of view of the participants, per-
haps, the traditional view of discussion is correct. Few men will deliber-
ately espouse a point of view they consider irrational, and most will attri-
bute changes of mind to the processes of rational persuasion. But from the
27. Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L REv. 1086 (1957).
28. You are to be governed, therefore, solely by the evidence introduced in this
trial, and the law as given you by the Court. The law will not permit jurors to be
governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion or prejudice, public
opinion, or public feeling. Both the public and defendants have a right to demand,
and they do so demand and expect, that you will carefully and dispassionately weigh
and consider the evidence and the law of the case.
It is the duty of each of you to consider and weigh all the evidence in the case,
and from such evidence to determine, if you can, the question of guilt or innocence
of the defendants or any of them. When you have so determined that question, you
should not be influenced in giving your verdict by the mere fact that any number
or all of your fellow jurors may have reached a different conclusion.
Yankwich, J., charging the jury in United States v. Bell, 8 F.R.D. 118 (S.D. Cal. 1943). Of
course the officially rationalist view of the jury does not prevent courts from tolerating
emotional appeals to jurors: the Tennessee Supreme Court, indeed, once deided that the
use of tears is a "natural right of counsel which no . . . constitution could take away."
Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 351, 39 S.V. 341, 343 (1896). See generally Skidmore v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948); J. Fw.ANK, Couirs ox TrUL 108.45 (1950);
A. OsBoRN, THE MiNi oF =a JuRoR (1938).
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point of view of an outsider there is good reason to discard the traditional
view of the jury's deliberations.29
In small groups generally, certain patterns of influence, based on the
size of opposing factions, the degree of participation in discussions, and
the personal characteristics of different group members, create pressures
to uniformity regardless of the content of the particular arguments ad-
vanced.30 Discussion in a jury room should be no more immune to these
non-rational influences than discussion in a board room, a classroom, or
a sociology lab.31 Evidence available from direct studies of juries in op-
eration tends to confirm that the content of argument is not decisive.
First, if content were the important factor in persuasion, we should ex-
pect that as two factions near agreement, their arguments would come
closer together and increase in rationality. Yet the fact is that as delib-
erations progress, the two sides take more and more radical positions,
their arguments increasing in violence and irrationality.32 Second, a
29. . . [W]e suspect that the jurors' talk may often be not very revealing. ...
[T]he real cause of a juror's decision will be in many instances a factor he himself
is only dimly aware of and perhaps unable to articulate.
But even when the juror is aware of his motives, he may not wish to disclose them.
He may choose to argue his point more in terms of proper legal considerations than
in terms of the extra-legal ones he privately finds persuasive. Finally, we know
that some jurors either cannot or prefer not to talk much and rather limit their
participation to voting. We are thus disposed to assert that the analysis of jury delibera-
tions would add little to a theory of why the jury disagrees with the judge.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 486-87 (1966).
S0. See B. BEREI.SON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR 338-39 (1964); Festinger, Gerard,
Hymovitch, Kelly & Raven, The Influence Process in the Presence of Extreme Deviates, 5
HuM. RELAT. 327, 36-37 (1952). The process seems to be accelerated by the lack of any
standards external to the group, resulting in a necessity for members to judge the correct-
ness of their views by comparison with those expressed by others-a process of "validation
by consensus." See Gerard, The Effect of Different Dimensions of Disagreement on the
Communication Process in Small Groups, 6 HuM. RELAT. 249 (1953); Festinger, Gerard,
et al., supra, at 336; Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison, in SMALL Guou's 146, 165
(rev. ed. A. Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales 1966); Newcomb, An Approach to the Study of
Communicative Acts, in id. 132, 137; B. BERxLSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEIAVIOR 334-5
(1964). This is the situation in the jury room, where (considerations of directed verdict
and new trial apart) the jury's discretion is unfettered and no external standard, other than
the jurors' consciences, provided for its exercise.
31. Kalven, The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OIlO ST.
L.J. 158, 176 (1958).
32. C. Hawkins, Interaction & Coalition Realignments in Consensus-Sceking Groups:
A Study of Experimental Jury Deliberations 132, August 17, 1960 (unpublished doctoral
thesis in sociology on file in the University of Chicago Library). This may be related to the
finding, made by many students of small-group interaction, that as discussion proceeds In a
consensus-seeking group, communication tends to be directed primarily to the most
extreme deviants; moderate deviants are ignored, relatively speaking, while the con-
formers concentrate their fire on the radicals. See Festinger, Gerard, et al., supra note 30,
at 36-40; Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison, supra note 30, at 165; Festlnger &
Thibaut, Interpersonal Communication in Small Groups, 46 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCI.
92 (1957).
108
Vol. 78: 100, 1968
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries
sizable minority of jurors assent to verdicts with which they disagree"3
-- conduct unexpected were their convictions and vote the result solely
of rational argument.3 4
Yet if it is wrong to regard the jury as a debating society, it is equally
wrong to treat it as on all fours with the small groups of sociological
theory. The jury is a legal institution, and the rules under which it op-
erates foster and protect only a few of the influence mechanisms com-
mon in small groups generally. Others are banned, either by express
judicial pronouncement or by subsidiary devices that radically restrict
their scope and effectiveness. 35 The result is different both from the ra-
33. Post-deliberation interviews show that 10 per cent of jurors arc willing to admit
that they were "pressured" into their verdict, i.e., that they were unconvinced when the
vote was delivered. James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 Am. J. SocioLOtY 563.
567-69 (1959); C. Hawkins, supra note 32, at 71, 102. Such figures no doubt underestimate
the real amount of pressure, since jurors will be unwilling to confess conduct that is
considered improper, and since many jurors may not appreciate how their own percep-
tions shift as a result of others' opinions. See H. KALVEN & H. ZmEts, upra note 29. and
Kalven, supra note 31. Only 60 per cent of jurors in panels that ultimately reach a decision
believe in that verdict at the outset of deliberations. James, supra, at 569.
Recognition of the disparity between theory and actuality no doubt underlies the
traditional reluctance to let the true convictions of jurors be Shown by post-deliberation
interviews. Cf. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); A.B.A. CANo Ns or Pnorrssio.AL. E-ucs No. 23;
D.C.D. Conn. R. 11(d). But this attitude seems to be changing. Parker v. Gladden. 385
U.S. 363 (1966); People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.YS.2d 526 (1967);
A.B.A. COMMs. ON PROFEssIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 319 (1967). See generally Comment.
After the Verdict: May Counsel Interrogate Jurors? 17 CATi. U.L.R. 465 (1968).
34. An additional striking example of irrational result is the jury's treatment of
defendant's insurance coverage. Juries aware of defendant's insurance but instructed to
disregard it discuss it much less frequently, and fewer of their mentions of insurance
carry an implication of increased damages, than is the case with juries (also aware of the
coverage) that receive no instructions on the subject. If content were decisive, we should
expect the lower frequency of discussion of insurance to be reflected in a lower level of
awards. But in fact just the opposite is true-verdicts of the non-discussing juries are
some 12 per cent higher than those of the discussing ones. Kalven, A Report on the jury
Project of the University of Chicago Law School, 24 INs. CoUNS. 3. 368, 378 (1957).
35. The problem of defining just what the legal rules permit is complicated by the old
rule, dating from Vaise v. Delaval, I T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). that the
affidavits of jurors are incompetent to impeach their own verdicts. Since evidence from
other sources is almost never available, the Vaise rule, strictly applied, means that no
verdict may ever be upset, whatever the asserted misconduct. See generally Comment.
Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CH. L. R v. 360 (1958); 8 J. lwISo.E EvWEcE
§§ 2345, 2352-53 (3d ed. 1940); Crawford v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 60 (1821) (Vaise a
development of common law posterior to the Revolution; not part of American law).
A few states (Texas is the leading example, see TEXAS CODE Cra.I. Pnoc. ANN. art. 753
(1950)) have abolished the Vaise rule entirely. Their courts are therefore at liberty to
decide openly the underlying question-whether the misconduct shown is serious enough
to justify reversal. Other states, and the federal courts, have achieved much the same
result, while pretending to follow gaise. These jurisdictions adopt the so-called Iowa
rule-actually best stated in the Kansas case of Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874)-to the
effect that jurors' affidavits are inadmissible to impeach matters that "inhere in the
verdict," but not as to other matters. The effect of such a rule is that decisions as to
whether misconduct justifies reversal are couched in terms of the admissibility of evidence.
See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915);
Carson v. Brauer, 234 Ore. 333, 382 P.2d 79 (1963). Some states, finally, stick to the un-
modified False rule. E.g., Kollert v. Cundiff, 10 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958).
Apart from these distinctions, a group of (mostly) code states have followed the lead of
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tional discussion model of judicial myth and from the unfettered interac-
tion of sociological theory: an institution comprehensible only in terms of
the way legal rules foster, limit, or forbid the various modes of persua
sion.
A. Coalition Pressure
The first of these modes of persuasion is what we shall call "coalition
pressure." Participants in a discussion are often influenced to change
their opinion simply by the knowledge that an overwhelming majority
disagrees with them. Consistent disapproval by the majority can shake
a small minority's faith even in judgments it believes to be right.o Such
pressures are most effective against a single dissenter and fall off rapidly
in efficacy as the size of the dissenting coalition increases.37 A single ally
gives most dissenters the courage to voice their true convictions.s Hence
in the typical divided jury situation, where there is usually more than
one dissenter, coalition pressure alone will not suffice to bring about
agreement.
Legal rules make it possible for coalition pressure to work effec-
tively. The mechanism requires, above all else, that each member of
the jury always knows how the group is divided. The most effective way
of spreading such knowledge is an open vote, conducted by a show of
hands or other method which reveals how each juror stands. The im-
pact of such a poll on dissenting jurors is sometimes so great that they
California by enacting provisions permitting the impeachment of "chance" verdicts.
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 657 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 10-602 (1948); Ky. CaIN!. CODE § 272
(1953); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 93-5603, 94-7603 (1947); N.D. Rules Civ. P. 59(b) 2; S.D.
CODE §§ 33.1605, 34.4005 (1939); UTAH RULES Civ. P. 59(a) 2; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.76.020(1961). These statutes have had little impact, since verdicts truly arrived at by lot are rare.
In the text that follows, an attempt has been made to draw conclusions as to permissiblojury conduct only from those jurisdictions that do not apply the strict Vaise rule. Only
in these states do the judges have sufficient freedom to overturn a verdict so that one
can say that a failure to overturn implies approval of the practice involved.
36. Sherif, Group Influences Upon the Formation of Norms and Attitudes, In READIN0s
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249 (rev. ed. G. Swanson 1952); B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 331-32 (1964); Asch, Effects of Group Pressure on the Modification and Distortion
of Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (E. Maccoby 3d ed. 1958).
37. The power of this "coalition" influence was demonstrated in a famous series of
experiments. Subjects in a group observed lines on white cards, and were asked to say
which of four lines matched in length. All the members of each group but one were
coached by the experimenters to give the same answer, which was deliberately wrong.
The lone unsuspecting member of the group, at first barely able to believe his ears, in
most cases succumbed to the coalition pressure of the group by giving the same answer
as the others. Asch, Opinions and Group Pressure, in SmALL Gaoups 318 (rev. ed. A. Hare,
E. Borgatta & R. Bales 1966).
38. In the Asch experiment, supra note 37, the addition of a second "honest" man to the
group caused the rate of group-induced errors to fall off 75 per cent. Id. 322.
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change their votes immediately after the balloting, making it unmistak-
ably dear that the adverse split was the direct cause of their conver-
sion. Cases of vote-switching after a ballot are usually appealed on the
grounds that the verdict was not truly unanimous, since dissenting ju-
rors could not, in any meaningful sense, have so quickly altered their
opinions. Yet such appeals are ordinarily dismissed. A verdict is im-
peachable only if there is evidence not simply of a change in votes, but
of an agreement, before the balloting, to abide by the result.39 The
effect of this doctrine is to permit conversions resulting from the size
of the majority-in other words, to give the coalition pressure mecha-
nism full opportunity to function.
B. Verbal Pressure
Unlike coalition pressure, verbal pressure depends not on the size of
the opposing coalitions, but on the willingness and ability of each to
express its views. It has long been recognized that influence in a discus-
sion tends to be proportional to participation: over the long run those
who talk the most convince the most.4 0
Verbal pressure is peculiarly important to the jury because of the
tendency of the two factions of a divided jury to do an equal share of
the talking, regardless of faction size.41 A coalition of eight members
39. No agreement: Ewing v. Union P.RR., 117 Kan. 200, 231 P. 334 (1924); Olins v.
Shocket, 31 Tenn. 346, 215 S.W.2d 18 (1948); Boddeker v. Olschcwswke, 127 Tex. 598, 94
S.W.2d 730 (1936). Agreement: Kindy v. Willingham, 146 Tex. 548, 209 S.W.2d 585 (1948);
State v. Guillory, 163 La. 98, 111 So. 612 (1927); Memphis & C.R.R. v. Pillow, 56 Tenn.
248 (1872); Ryerson v. Kitchell's Executor, 3 N.J. 727 (1813). Cf. Myra Foundation v. United
States, 267 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1959); Young v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. RLv. 929, 42 S.W.
1141 (1897); State v. Brooks, 23 Mont. 146, 57 P. 1038 (1899).
The rule, as was pointed out by the courts in Olins and Ewing, supra, is closely analogous
to that governing quotient verdicts. These, too, are held bad only if the) are the result
of a previous agreement to abide by the result of the computation. E. L. Farmer Co. v. Hooks,
239 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911 (1957); Consolidated Ice Machine
Co. v. Trenton Hygeian Ice Co., 57 F. 898 (C.C.NJ. 1893); Will v. Southern Pacific Co., IS
Cal. 2d 468, 116 P.2d 44 (1941); Jurgens v. Davenport, R.I. & N. Ry., 249 Iowa 711, 88
N.W.2d 797 (1958); Hamilton v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 95 Kan. 353, 148 P. 648 (1915);
Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 10 S.E.2d 145 (1940). But cf. Southern Elec. Generat-
ing Co. v. Howard, 275 Ala. 498, 156 So. 2d 359 (1963) (agreement inferred from use of
quotient method).
40. Bass, An Analysis of Leaderless Group Discussion, 33 J. Arxrn PsycH. 527-33 (1949);
Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, Social Status in jury Deliberations, 22 A M. SOCiOL. REv.
713, 715-16 (1957); Bales, The Analysis of Small Group Interaction, 15 Ai.m SocoL. REV.
257-64 (1950); Strodtbeck, Husband-Wife Interaction over Revealed Differences, in SmA.M
GRouPs 591, 592, 597 (rev. ed. P. Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales 1966).
In an experiment reported by Strodtbeck, supra, at 592, groups of three members were
required to recommend a joint solution to a particular problem. The experimenters found
that the best prediction of the result in each group was obtained by weighting the pre-
deliberation opinion of each member of the group by the amount of time he had spoken.
41. Hawkins, supra note 32, at 123-37.
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talks only very slightly more than the opposing four-man coalition. The
theory of verbal pressure would indicate, and experimental conclusions
confirm, that when coalitions of differing size do an equal share of the
talking, the balance of influence between them tends to be equal. In
general neither one side nor the other will make converts. 42
But if such a balance of interaction is to be maintained, it is obvious
that, man for man, the members of a small coalition must talk more
than members of a larger one. Members of a four-man coalition must
talk twice as much as members of an eight-man one. Even for a four-
man coalition so much talking tends to set up strains on the coalition
members, and the strain is greater as coalition size decreases. Argument
is hard work: those who talk much tire and fall silent if allies are not
available to spell them. 43 Sooner or later a small coalition will probably
be unable to keep up with the larger one. The result is usually the con-
version of one or more members of the smaller coalition. 44
As in the case of coalition pressure, the legal rules foster verbal pres-
sure. For instance, jurors are given wide freedom to browbeat one
another. Any kind of verbal harassment-shouting, angry words, in-
terruption of other speakers-is allowed.4" Thus in United States v.
Grieco,4" a minority juror complained that loud talking and brow-
beating by a majority juror had so intimidated her that she had been
afraid to open her mouth during the deliberations. The Second Circuit
thought these facts were "very far from the kind of showing that must
be made" to overturn a verdict.47 The Court, like other courts that
42. Id.
43. There is some evidence that individuals have a characteristic upper-bound par-
ticipation rate: they will talk so much and no more. Hence ability to influence members
of a group will turn on the relationship among the characteristic upper-bound participa-
tion rates of the members. See Borgatta & Bales, Interaction of Individuals in Reconsti-
tuted Groups, 16 SociomvRY 302 (1953), reprinted in SMALL GROUPS 370 (rev. ed. P. Hare,
E. Borgatta & R. Bales 1966). When the group is split into factions, of course, the combined
characteristic participation rates of the minority may not be sufficient to occupy half the
discussion time.
44. It hardly matters whether the immediate cause of this conversion is the strain of
a deliberate attempt to maintain the balance of interaction, C. Hawkins, supra note 32, at
131, or whether a slackening of the ability of one side to participate in the discussion
increases the share of the other side in the argument, and results in greater influence for
the larger group. Sources cited note 30 supra. The outcome is the same under either
theory. Whether the effect be direct or indirect, the cause of conversions is the inability
of the smaller group to talk as hard or as long as the larger one.
45. "The law does not undertake to limit or control the arguments by which one
juror may convince the mind of another." State v. Wakely, 43 Mont. 427, 117 P. 95 (1911),
State v. Corner, 58 S.D. 579, 237 N.W. 912 (1931).
46. 261 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1958).
47. Id. at 415. "It is not possible to determine mental processes of jurors by the strict
tests available in an experiment in physics; we have to deal with human beings, whose
opinions are inevitably to some extent subject to emotional controls that are beyond any
accessible scrutiny." 261 F.2d at 415. The court did suggest, however, that a verdict would
be upset for a threat of violence by one juror against another. Id.
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have considered the problem,48 was in effect recognizing that the brow-
beating complained of was merely the normal operation of the verbal
pressure mechanism. To restrict jurors to gentlemanly talk about the
case and to prohibit them from invoking the heat and passion of argu-
ment or saying harsh things about one another is to narrow the oppor-
tunities for the creation of the strains and the expenditure of nervous
energy that break down the minority's willingness to hold to its posi-
tion. Only through this process does the majority achieve a greater share
of participation and begin to influence, persuade, and convert other
jurors.
The rules against separation of the jury4 also foster the verbal pres-
sure mechanism. If the jury is permitted to separate at frequent inter-
vals, there is a lessening of the strains which would be set up by the
necessity of continuing to talk. The verbal pressure mechanism must
begin over again from scratch whenever the minority is permitted to
rest, become refreshed, and marshal its strength.a9
48. State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 216 A.2d 369 (1966); Carson v. Brauer. 234 Ore. 333.
382 P.2d 79 (1963); People v. Van Camp, 356 Mich. 593, 97 N.V.2d 726 (1959); State v.
Imlah, 204 Ore. 43, 281 P.2d 973 (1955); Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 102 A.2d 714
(1954) (Sobeloff, C.J.); State v. Bischoff. 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1920); 'Wester v. Hedberg.
68 Minn. 434, 71 N.W. 616 (1897). Cf. Wharton v. People, 104 Colo. 260, 90 P.2d 615 (1939).
Other cases reach the same result but rely on the theory that, while the irregularities
are serious enough to merit reversal, they may not be shown by jurors' affidavits. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965); Smith v. Rodick, 286 S.W.2d
73 (Mo. App. 1956); Brinsfield v. Haveth, 110 Md. 520, 73 A. 289 (1909). Cf. Kollert v.
Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958); Johnson v. Hunter, 144 F.2d 565 (10th Cir.
1944).
49. At common law the jury was not allowed to separate either during deliberations
or during the trial. In England, the old rules retain something of their force, and separa-
tion during deliberations in a criminal trial is error justifying reversal. R. v. Neal, (1949]
2 K.B. 590. Separation during trial is allowed in England in criminal cases by statute.
Criminal Justice Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 58, § 35(4) (1948). but forbidden where the common
law applies, as in Northern Ireland. R. v. Taylor, [1951] N.T.L.IL 57. Separation at any
time during a civil case is permissible. Fanshaw v. Knowles, [1916] 2 ILB. 538. See generally
Barry, On the Segregation of Jurors, 6 Rrs JUDICATAE 139 (1953).
In the United States, in civil cases, separation during trial has always been the prevail-
ing rule, and jurors are customarily permitted to go home at the end of each day's trial.
After submission of the case, it is usually within the trial court's discretion to permit
separation for some reasonable purpose-rest, illness, food, a week-end. See Cleary v.
Indiana Beach Co., 275 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1960); Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir.
1958); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1086 (1961).
In criminal cases, the various jurisdictions have a patchwork of rules. Separation during
trial is often forbidden by statute in capital cases, and sometimes in felony or indeed all
criminal cases, though many of these provisions allow for judicial discretion or for the
consent of the parties. Separation after submission is governed by similar rules, but more
strictly enforced. In federal courts the matter is within the trial judge's sound discretion.
Bratcher v. United States, 149 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 (1945);
Brown v. United States, 69 App. D.C. 96, 99 F.2d 131 (1938); Annot., 21 A.LR.2d 1088
(1952).
50. It is at least possible that the rules permitting frequent balloting, though esvential
to the coalition pressure mechanism, see p. III supra, may also be employed by a
short-handed minority faction to gain a much-needed rest. On the other hand, open
balloting does help the majority by telling the members on the same side just who their
allies are, thus permitting them to spell one another more efficiently.
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C. Expertise
A man who is thought to have peculiar knowledge in a given area
will have more influence than one who is thought to be inexperienced.
Such influence appears to be independent both of the content of the
"expert's" statements and of the variations in influence resulting from
his degree of participation in the discussion. The effect of a given state-
ment varies in relation to the listener's perception of the speaker's ex-
pertise. 1
Although this type of influence is very important to most problem-
solving groups, the law attempts to minimize its effects in the jury
room. Most conspicuously, those who have some clear claim of knowl-
edge in an area thought to be related to the trial are not chosen for
service as jurors.52 The familiar exclusion of lawyers exemplifies this
attitude.53 So does the refusal to have medically trained people on most
51. See Gerard, Effect of Disagreement on Communication Process in Small Groups,
6 HuM. RELAT. 249, 265-71 (1953).
52. "In a lawsuit involving a bridge no bridgebuilder or anyone who knows anything
about bridges is allowed to serve, and in a legal contest over rayon of course no one who
knows anything about rayon would be accepted as a juror by one of the parties."
A. OsBorn, THE MIND OF THE JUROR 18 (1937).
These exclusions may come about in three ways. A few classes of potential jurors are
disqualified by statute from jury service--as is the case, for example, with lawyers in
three states. N.D. CENr. CODE § 27.0902 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (1951); S.D. CODE
(Supp. 1960) § 32.1001. More frequently, large classes of jurors are granted "exemptions":
in theory this means they may serve but need not; in practice that they are not called
because struck from the jury list. See, eg., CALIF. CODE Csv. P. § 205 (West 1954); D.C. CODE
§ 11-2302 (1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-219 (1958); 8A MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 234
§ 4 (1932); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 593-95 (1968); PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 1092 (Purdon 1930). For a
description of how effectively the exemption system works as a total disqualification, see
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.). See generally A. VANDER-
BILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 162-81 (1949); ABA, PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 40-67
(Tent. Draft, 1968). A third group of potential jurors are eliminated by challenge, either
"challenge for cause" by the judge, or "peremptory challenge" by one or the other side.
The use of statutory disqualifications and exemptions has been upheld by the Supreme
Court, providing there is no pattern of discrimination on racial, religious, economic, or
sexual grounds. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
U.S. 217 (1946); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). Nor may peremptory challenges be
used to create a pattern of racial exclusion. Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
Law and practice in the area of jury selection are now changing rapidly. See Jury Selection
& Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1862, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMt. NEWS, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
679 (1968); Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 101, US. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 708 (1968); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
53. Which is sometimes carried to ridiculous lengths. Thus the attorney in San Nicolas
v. Government of Guam, 325 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1963) (described by the court as an
"incredible appeal'), contended that the fact that the jury had met in the judge's law
library required reversal.
Lawyers are disqualified in three states, see note 52 supra, and exempted in the others.
8 CODE OF ALA. tit. 30, § 3 (1958); ARIZ. REv. STATS. 21-202 (1956): 3B ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-104 (1947); CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. § 200 (West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT. § 78--3 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 851-219 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504 (Supp. 1966); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-2302 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.08(2) (1943); 2 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-203
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juries,5 4 despite the importance of injuries in most civil53 and many
criminal cases.56 Similarly, this is at least partially the basis of the re-
fusal to allow those with personal knowledge of the material facts to
serve on a jury.57 None of these prohibitions makes sense solely as pro-
(1948); IL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd) c. 78, § 4 (1936); 40 IoWA CoDE ANN. § 607.2 (1949);
KAN. GEN. STAT. § 43-116 (1961); Ky. REV. STAT. § 29.030(2)(h) (1960); LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
art. 532.2 (1953); LA. REV. STAT. § 1950 (1950); LA. Cuam. Poc. CODE ANN. art. 174 (%West
1966); 7 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 103, § 5 (1964); 8A MASS. GEN. L ws ANN. c. 24, § 1
(1932); MICH. ComP. LAws § 691.1021 (1961); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 593.04, 628.43 (1951);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 1764 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 496.100 (1949); Morr. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 8893, as amended, L. 1939, c. 203 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-601 (1947); 2 NEV. Com.
LAWS § 8479 (1967); 3 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 375, § 3 (1955); 5 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-102
(1953); N.Y. JUD. LAw §§ 546, 599 (1948); lB N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-19, as amended, L. 1947.
c. 1007 (1949); ORE. REV. STAT. § 10.040(3) (1967); PA. STAT. (Purdon 1930) tit. 17, § 1279
(2d class county act), tit. 17, § 1322 (3d class county act); R.I. GEN. LAus § 9.9-4 (1957);
S.C. CODE § 629 (1962); 4 TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-103 (1956); 6 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon)
art. 2135, as amended, L. 1927, c. 88, L. 1931, c. 221, L. 1935, c. 106 (1925); 9 UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-0-10 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. § 1724 (1959); 2 VA. CODE ANN. § 5985 (1950); WASH. REV.
CODE (Remington) § 95 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5262 (1966); Wls. STAT. A,.. § 255.02(2)
(1957); 4 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 12-103 (1957).
54. Doctors are exempt in most states. 8 CODE or ALA. it. -0, § 3 (1958); Ann. REV.
STATS. § 21-202 (1956); 3B Am STAT. ANN. § 39-104 (1957); CAL. CODE CIV. Pnoc. § 200(6
(West 1954); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-219 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. Lit. 10 § 454
(Supp. 1966); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2302 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.08(2) (1943); 8 GA.
CODE ANN. § 59-112 (1938); 2 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-203 (1948); IL.. REV. STAT. c. 78, § 4
(Smith-Hurd 1936); 40 IowA CODE ANN. § 607.2 (1949); KAN. GE . STAT. § 43-116 (1961);
KY. REv. STAT. § 29-050 (1960); LA. Civ. CODE art. 532.2 (West 1967); 7 ME. REV. STAT.
c. 103, § 5 (1964); 5 MD. ANN. CODE art. 51, § 3 (1957); 8A MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 234,
§ 1 (1932); MxcH. Comip. LAws § 691.1021 (1961); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 593.04, 628.43 (1951);
Miss. CODE 496.100 (1949); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 699; MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. § 8893 (1947);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1963); NEV. Comp. LAws § 8479 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
c. 375, § 3 (1955); 4 N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:86-1 (1937); 5 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (1953);
N.Y. Jun. LAw §§ 546, 599 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-19 (1949); NJD. Crr. CODE § 27-090
(1960); Omo REV. CODE § 2313.34 (1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 10, as amended, L. 1937,
p. 2 (1938); ORE. REV. STAT. § 10.040(4) (1967); PA. STAT. tit. 17, §§ 1279, 1322 (Purdon
1930) (2d class & 3d class counties); PI. GEE. LAws § 9-9-4 (1957); S.D. CODE § 32.1002
(Supp. 1960); 4 TENN. CODE 22-103 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2195, as amended
(Vernon 1925); 9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-0-10 (1953); 3 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1724 (1959); VA.
CODE ANN. § 5985; WASH. REV. CODE § 95 (Remington 1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5262
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 255.02(2) (1957); 4 WVo. STAT. ANN. § 12-103 (1957). If any doctor,
or a medical student, nurse, or hospital employee should happen to be on the jury panel
in a personal injury case, normal practice is to exercise a peremptory challenge. See
1 F. BUSCH, LAw AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 836 (1959).
55. In 1929-32, negligence cases accounted for 81 per cent of all civil jury trials in New
Haven County. Clark & Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial Admin-
istration, 43 YALE L.J. 867, 870 (1934). There is no reason to suppose this ratio has
decreased since then.
56. In some cases where challenges are exercised because the lawyer (or the court)
believes the juror will be biased, the situation may be easier to explain in terms of
expertise. Thus no sensible attorney would permit an honest bank official to sit on a jury
trying another bank official for embezzlement: the prosecutor would fear leniency to a
co-worker, and the defense zeal to uphold the honor of banks. But if the excluded jurors
"bias" thus runs in both directions, one is justified in concluding that it is a case of no
bias at all: the institutional objection to the bank official is not that he will favor one
side over the other, but that-whichever side he chooses-lie will have excessive, "expert,"
influence over the other jurors.
57. See Bridgman v. Baxter County, 202 Ark. 15. 17, 148 S.V.2d 673 (1941); Cook v.
Kansas City, 358 Mo. 296, 214 S.V.2d 430, 433 (1948); McFall v. St. Louis & S.F.R.LR,
185 S.W. 1157, 1158 (Mo. App. 1916) (juror expert on essential question in case); Wilon
v. State, 87 Neb. 638, 644-45, 128 N.V. 38, 40-41 (1910); Rust v. Reid, 124 Va. 1, 22, 97
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tection of the jury's role as factfinder-indeed, the critics of the jury
system recommend more, not fewer, experts. 8 They can be explained
by a desire to exclude the possibility of "expert" influence in the jury
room.
Fear of expert influence may also partially underlie the rule against
the jury's considering matters not in evidence. For instance, when a
juror told his fellows of his reading on a scientific matter of importance
to the case, judgment was reversed without even an allegation that the
juror's research was erroneous. 9 This result cannot depend simply on
preventing surprise to the parties or assuring cross-examination, since
judges are at liberty to take judicial notice of well-established scientific
facts.60 But the juror who does outside research impermissibly acquires
an influence out of proportion to that which coalition and verbal pres-
sure alone would give him.
D. Other Influences
Influence as a result of force or the threat of force is, of course, clearly
excluded from jury deliberations. Even courts that observe policies
against inquiring into jury deliberations are willing to overturn verdicts
upon a showing of force."'
Other types of influence found in some small groups are likely to be
unimportant in the jury. In a normal situation, friendship is a factor
in persuasion analogous to expertise: other things being equal, people
S.E. 324, 330 (1918); Alexson v. Pierce County, 186 Wash. 188, 192, 57 P.2d 318, 320 (1936).
" The purpose of the law is to get persons who can and will try the case fairly andbase their verdict on the law and the evidence. Of course, if their opinion is based onfacts within their knowledge, or evidence that they have heard, they would not be
competent jurors. But the fact that they have formed or expressed an opinion does notdisqualify them from serving on the jury if the opinion is based on rumor." Hlam v. State,179 Ark. 20, 26, 13 S.W.2d 805 (1929); cf. Jester v. State, 100 Tex. Crim. 409, 273 S.W. 570,571 (1925). A more perfect statement of the proposition that knowledge is forbidden would
be difficult to imagine.
58. "Many persons seem to believe that they have a constitutional right to an ignorantjury .. " United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 258 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir.),(Clark, C.J.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1958). See also Sunderland, Verdicts, General and
Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920); J. FRANK, LAW & THE MODEP.N MIND Ch. XVI (1930); DuBois,
Desirability of Blue Ribbon Juries, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1962). Some have advocated the
testing of jurors, psychological and otherwise, or the use of restrictive educational qual-fications. Redmount, Psychological Tests for Selecting Jurors, 5 KAN. L. REV. 391 (1957);
Note, 65 YALE L.J. 531 (1956); Note, 1950 Wis. L. Rav. 690.59. Thomas v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 185 Kan. 6, 340 P.2d 379 (1959).
60. State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. App. 1959); McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crin.416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1950); C. MCCORMsICK, EVIDENCE 712 (1954); Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 9(2)(d).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907(1958); Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 102 A.2d 714 (1954); Carson v. Brauer, 234 Ore.333, 382 P.2d 79 (1963).
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will be more easily persuaded by speakers they like.02 Since juries are
chosen broadly and few jurors are previously acquainted, the influence
of friendship tends to be small.63 Similarly, except for the foreman,
whose influence is mainly procedural, 64 juries lack any formal structure
and hence are likely to be unaffected by the formal leadership influence
that occurs in other groups.
II. Pressure Mechanisms and the Optimal Decision Rule
The preceding discussion shows that in jury deliberations two pat-
terns of influence-coalition pressure and verbal pressure-are encour-
aged, while other types of influence are discouraged or unimportant.
Since the effectiveness of both these mechanisms depends on the size
of the majority coalition (with certain exceptions to be discussed later5 ),
there must be a tipping point that divides winning and losing coali-
tion sizes. That is, a majority greater than a certain critical size will
usually be able to overcome the minority's resistance, while one less
than the critical size will normally fail to do so. The precise location
of the tipping point, of course, is hard to specify, but one researcher
suggests that eight- or nine-man coalitions may well be the critical size.cG
Legal rules prohibiting caucusing by jurors appear to recognize
that the existence of a tipping point is of considerable importance to
the proper functioning of the jury system. Under these rules individual
jurors are not permitted to talk over the case or the evidence among
themselves either during 7 or after" the trial. All deliberations must
62. See Newcomb, An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts, 60 PsycH. RM.
393, 399 (1953), reprinted in SMALL GROUPS 132, 138 (rev. ed. P. Hare, E. Borgatta & R.
Bales 1966).
63. There is, however, some evidence that new friendships are made and influence
juror behavior to some extent. The effect depends particularly on the seating pattern
at the jury table. See Strodtbeck & Hook, The Social Dimensions of a Twelve Man Jury
Table, 24 Socio MyaY 397 (1961).
64. Cf. James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 Am. J. Soc. 563, 566 (1959).
65. Pp. 127-28 infra.
66. C. Hawkins, supra note 32, at 128. It is at this point that the ability of the
minority coalition to originate an equal share of the communication in the jury room
begins to fall off sharply.
67. Many jurisdictions have statutes requiring that the judge admonish the jury, on
adjournment during trial, not to discuss the case, either with others or among themselves.
Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. Ut. 17 R. Crim. Proc. 268 (1956); ARE. STAT. ANN. § 27-1733 (1947);
CAL. CODE CrV. PRoc. § 611 (1955); CAL. PrNAL CODE § 1122 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.06
(1944); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 10-210, 19-2127 (1948); ItND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1803 (1956). 2-2016
(1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 780.21-22 (1950); IowA R. Civ. P. 199(a); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-248 (1964); fo. ANN. STAT. § 546.230 (1953); MoNr. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 93-5103 (1964),
94-7231 (1949); NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.325 (1963); N.Y. CODE Cmu.t. P. § 415 (fcKinney
1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-21-28 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.05. 2945.34 (Page
1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 854 (1958); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit 34 R. 132 (Supp. 1963);
S.D. CODE §§ 33.1320, 34.3649 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-31-28 (1953); UTAH R.
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occur in the presence, and with the participation, of all twelve jurors.
Such rules make little sense in terms of aiding the jurors to arrive at
the truth, since discussion in groups of two or three may be as enlight-
ening as in the full jury. Nor do they make sense in terms of a desire
to restrict methods of persuasion to coalition and verbal pressure; for
both techniques can be applied as easily in a caucus as in the full jury.
The crucial difference between deliberation in caucuses and delibera-
tion in the full jury is the unpredictable variation in the critical size
that deliberation in caucuses would produce. If jurors meet first in
caucuses and then re-unite, some of them will have been converted in
the caucuses, where the proportions of jurors favoring different out-
comes will almost certainly be different than in the full jury. A juror
left alone in a caucus may be persuaded, unaware that he has allies in
other caucuses, whose support might be enough to confirm his own
views, were the full jury deliberating. 9
The existence of the tipping point means that the unanimity rule
Civ. P. 47(k); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 4.44.280 (1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. g§ 1-127, 7.237
(1957).
The rule in federal courts is not so clear. It is not reversible error for a judge to omit
to give an admonition against the jurors discussing the case with each other during
separations, United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 602 (2d Cir. 1965), Myres v. United States,
174 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 1949), although the admonition has been termed "vital," Kleven
v. United States, 240 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1957). In Winebrenner v. United States, 147
F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1945), the trial court was reversed for instructing the jury that discussion
among themselves was permissible; Judge Gardner explaining the reason of the rule as
follows:
This admonition is subject to the further criticism that it permitted groups or
coteries within the jury, including the alternate juror, to discuss the case during the
many weeks the Government was introducing evidence and to form opinions which
it was incumbent upon the defendants to overcome by evidence, whereas defendants
were entitled to have the case considerd not by divisions or coteries of jurors, which
might include the alternate juror, but by the entire jury. Courts have generally held
that after the case has finally been submitted and the jury placed in custody of an
officer to be kept together, that it is error to permit them to separate. Defendants
were entitled to have their case considered by all the jurors as a jury. Here, vilhoiut
instructions as to the law, without hearing all the testimony, and without hearing
argument of counsel, they were authorized to divide themselves into separate groups
and distinct deliberative bodies. So general is the rule that jurors should not discuss
a case prior to its submission to them, that it has been enacted into statute in
practically all the states of the Union.
147 F.2d at 329. But cf. Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 196 S.C. 230, 13 S.E.2d 1 (1941).
68. Most of the statutes cited in note 67 supra apply equally to separations after sub-
mission. When they do not expressly do so-as in Missouri, Mo. STAT, ANN, § 540.240
(1963), Nevada, NEv. Rav. STAT. § 175.320 (1963), and North Dakota, N.D. CENT, Coorn
§ 29-22-02 (1960), for example, the reason is that those states entirely forbid separation after
the submission of a criminal case. Hence the need for an admonition never arises.
In the federal courts, separation after submission is usually accompanied by an admonl
tion not to discuss the case. Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1958); Cleary v,
Indiana Beach, Inc., 275 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1960).
69. A good example of the effect of caucusing during deliberation is the situation
reported in Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85 (1848). Two jurors went into an adjoining room,
one of whom favored conviction, the other acquittal. When they returned, the latter
agreed to change his vote to guilty. The appellate court reversed an ensuing conviction.
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as usually stated is a sham. While receiving the apparent concurrence
of all jurors, most verdicts will in fact represent the convictions only of
a majority of the critical size or greater, transmuted into "unanimity"
by the operation of the dual pressure mechanisms. Yet this need not
lead us to question the legitimacy of jury verdicts, providing we accept
the contention, "made by almost every adherent of the jury system," 70
that the jury's function is to reflect the sentiments of the community.71
In fact, under this assumption it can be shown that the most efficient
jury decision rule72 is that which permits rule by a majority of the
critical size-an eight- or nine-man coalition-to determine the verdict.
The potential social costs of jury trials-losses from miscarriages of jus-
tice, from failures to resolve the controversy, and from wasted trials-
will be less under such a decision rule than under the rule of either
a simple (seven-man) majority or a majority of size ten or greater.
The calculation proceeds on the following assumptions:
(1) The correctness of a jury's verdict is determined by its correspon-
70. Broeder, Memorandum Regarding Jury System, in Hearings on tile Recording of
Jury Deliberations Before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 63 (1955).
71. Advocates and critics of the jury alike have agreed that the injection of popular
sentiments into the legal system is the principal characteristic of the jury. Juries, aid
Holmes, "will introduce into their verdict a certain amount-a very large amount, o far
as I have observed-of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law
in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community." Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HAnv. L. Rnv. 443, 460 (1899). See also Pound, Law in Books and Law
in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18-19 (1910); Wigmore, A Program for tile Trial of jury
Trial, 12 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 166, 170-71 (1929); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1286 (1952); J. FaANr, Courcrs oN TnrdA 129-S0(1948).
Early theory held that "[t]he verdict of the jurors is not just the verdict of twelve
men; it is the verdict of a pays, a 'country,' a neighborhood, a community." 2 F. Pou.ockt
& F. ,fArTLAND, HisroRY OF ENGLISH LAw 623 (1905). Jurors had the express power to
decide not only the facts of a case but the law that should govern It. and the judge's
instructions were advisory only. Such was the situation in the United States through most
of the nineteenth century. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.. 51 (1895); Howe,
juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HArv. L. REv. 582 (1939); Note, The Changing Role
of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964). The jury's ancient right
to make the law is still occasionally recognized today. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114
A.2d 150 (1955); Note, Jury Compromise in Pennsylvania Negligence Actions, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 732 (1961).
Even if the jury's right to modify the law is no longer untrammeled, the fact that an
issue in a case is left to the jury normally means that it is the judgment of the com-
munity that is sought. Thus in first amendment cases, where the applicable rule of law
is counter-majoritarian, the jury has very little scope for decision. Even where the test
to be applied is closely similar, the desirability of a community judgment will determine
whether the question is one for the judge or the jury: the "reasonableness" of conduct in
tort cases invariably goes to the jury, in commercial cases not so often, and in malicious
prosecution hardly ever. See Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law.Fact Distinction,
54 CAiF. L. REv. 1867 (1966).
72. "Decision rule" is a shorthand phrase for the rule specifying the size of majority
coalition necessary for its opinion to prevail. For example, if a verdict could be
rendered when nine of the twelve jurors voted for it, the jury would be operating
under the decision rule of nine.
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dence to the sentiments of the relevant community.73 Assume, for ex-
ample, that the trial is flashed by television into the homes of all mem-
bers of the community, who then mark down their personal verdict on
a secret ballot. If more than halF 4 the community favors Result A, a
jury verdict of A is "correct."
(2) Jurors are chosen randomly from the community."5 This means
that if a proportion p of the community favors Result A, with the re-
mainder (1 - p) favoring Result B, the probability of an individual
juror's favoring A will also be p. The value of p is assumed greater
than 0.50.
(3) The jury reaches a verdict by a single ballot, without delibera-
tion. If k or more jurors favor a given result, that is the jury's verdict;
if k - 1 or fewer favor either result, then the jury hangs. The value of
k is assumed to be seven or greater, so that the six possible values of k
(7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) yield the six possible jury decision rules.
73. Even apart from the dispute, note 71 supra, as to the jury's proper function as
against the judge, it is difficult to see what other test could be used to determine the
correctness of the jury's verdict. Any attempt to compare the jury's verdict with what
"actually" happened (even if we assume a difference between what "actually" happened
and what most people believe happened) will involve not simply whether the jury's verdict
was right but whether rules of evidence are proper, whether the case was well-tried,
whether the laws against perjury are strict enough, etc.
74. It would be possible to require more than a majority to agree before action couldbe taken. Thus one might set the "decision point" at, say, 60 per cent of the community-if 60 per cent favored Result A, a verdict of A would be proper; if 40 per cent or lessfavor A, then a verdict of B is proper; and if between 40 and 60 per cent favor A, then
no action either way will be taken-a sort of denial of certiorari at the trial level.This assumption, however, has little point except to complicate the mathematics further
on. It is difficult to see any reason for requiring a majority of greater than half, except
that we feel that the cost of an erroneous verdict is large in proportion to the cost of
a trial. This can be taken into account by varying the cost parameter for an erroneous
verdict directly, see p. 123 infra, without introducing the additional unknown parameter
of the "decision point."
In any event, the use of a decision point in the only range that is practically likely-55 or 60 per cent-does not significantly affect the results of the calculations for most
cost mixes.
75. The theory of the jury system has always maintained that jurors were to be chosen
randomly from the community-or at least from that proportion of it qualified (by thefranchise or otherwise) to take part in important decisions. The goal has more oftenbeen achieved in theory than in practice. Lindquist, An Analysis of Juror SelectionProcedure in the United States District Courts, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 32 (1967); Mills, A Statistical
Study of the Occupations of Jurors in a United States District Court, 22 MD. L. REV. 205(1962); Holbrook, A Survey of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Los Angeles Area, in C. JOINER,CIVIL JUsTICE AND THE JURY 195-200 (1962). The more blatant discriminations are, however,prohibited. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.187 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380U.S. 202 (1965). See generally Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theoryto the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966).
For our purposes, of course, it is not necessary that the community from which thejury is selected be equivalent to the "physical" community-any more than it is necessaryfor the voting population to be equivalent to the actual population. All that is required
is that jurors be selected randomly from the body of people who are placed on jurylists; for our purposes, this latter group is the relevant "community" to whom decisions
are entrusted.
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(4) There is some upper limit on the number of possible trials. The
equations and figures below are drawn up on the assumption that there
will be only two trials of a given case: if the first jury hangs, there will
be a second trial, but if that jury hangs, then the plaintiff/prosecutor
will give up, or the case will be settled. This is the invariable custom
in England and one suspects that in the United States there are few
cases indeed that give a third jury the chance to hang."0
The mathematics that follows is not complicated-although the arith-
metic is laborious-and may be summarized briefly. For each of the
various divisions of opinion in the community and for each of the six
76. The only other likely possibility is an upper limit of three trials. On this assump-
tion, expressions (1)-(4) infra, become:
3
(IA) P (result A) = I P(A)[1 - P(A) - P(B)]J-15=1
3
(2A) P (result B) = :E P(B)[I - P(A) - P(B)]J-1
J=1
(3A) P (no result) = 1 - P (result A) - P (result B)3
(4A) E[T/p] = 2 m P (m trials),
m=.1
where P (in trials) = [1 - P(A) - P(B)]-m [P(A) + P(B)] in < 2
2
= [P(A) + P(B)] I [I - P(A) - P(B)]k-i = 3
s;=1
and instead of Table UI, infra p. 126, we have the following:
TABLE A
EXPEcrED OVERALL COSTS FOR VARIATION IN Cu/CT (TiIREE TRIALS)
Number of Jurors
%/% 7 8 9 10 11 12
6 .2035 .2132 .2422 2906 .3513 .4190
8 .1807 J813 .1981 .2336 .2812 .3352
10 .1652 J595 .1681 .1948 .2335 .2782
12 .1542 J44. .1469 .1674 .1999 .2380
14 .1469 .1340 J328 .1492 .1775 .2112
16 .1405 .1250 .205 .1332 .1578 .1877
18 .1351 .1174 .1099 .1195 .1410 .1676
20 .1305 .1110 .011 .1081 .1270 .1509
22 .1275 .1068 .0953 .1006 .1177 .1398
24 .1246 .1027 .0896 .0933 .1088 .1291
26 .1220 .0991 .0847 .0869 .1009 .1197
28 .1198 .0960 OS05 .0814 .0942 .1116
30 .1180 .0935 .0769 .0769 .0886 .1049
32 .1163 .0910 .0736 .0725 .0832 .0986
The table means that the rule of eight or nine will be most efficient for a somewhat
higher range of C.'s than if a two-trial limit is adopted. This need create no difficulties,
since it may be assumed that those cases pressed on to a third trial 'will be those whom
intrinsic importance is great, and where the ratio Crt/CT will tend to be large. Hence a
rule of eight or nine will continue to be most efficient.
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jury decision rules, one can compute the likelihood of the five possible
outcomes: at the first trial the jury may arrive at either Result A or
Result B; if it hangs, a second jury may come to either result or it may
hang, leaving the controversy unresolved. Costs may be assigned to each
outcome so as to reflect the expenses of new trials, of erroneous verdicts,
and of failing to decide the case. Given any division of opinion in the
community, we can derive an "expected cost" for each jury decision
rule-adding together the cost of each outcome multiplied by its likeli-
hood. The most efficient decision rule will be the one whose expected
cost is lower, on the average, for all of the possible divisions of com-
munity opinion.
In algebraic terms, we have the following.
If proportion p of the community favors Result A, then the prob-
ability of a single juror's favoring A is also p, and the probability that
exactly m jurors favor A will be:
121
ml(12 - m)l
If the jury uses decision rule k, such that a verdict of X will be returned
if and only if k or more jurors favor X, then the probability of verdict
A is the probability that k or more jurors favor A. Hence,
12
P 1A) ml 121 ptm (I - P)12-m
,-k ml(12 - m)l
Conversely, the probability of verdict B is the probability that 12 - k
or fewer jurors favor verdict A. Hence,
12-kP(--E 12! pm (I - p)2-T
P(B)= ml(12 - m)
The probability of a hung jury will be:
P(H) = 1 - P(A) - P(B)
These are the probabilities of the outcome at any single trial. Hence
they must be modified if two trials are allowed. The probability of
verdict A after two trials-P(result A)-will be the sum of the prob-
ability that A is returned on the first trial plus the probability of a hang
on the first trial followed by a verdict of A on the second trial. Hence,
(1) P(result A) = P(A) + P(A) [1 - P(A) - P(B)]
Similarily:
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(2) P(result B) = P(B) + P(B) [1 - P(A) - P(B)]
and, for the probability of no verdict after two trials:
(3) P(no result) = 1 - P(result A) - P(result B)
One can also calculate the expected number of trials that will be re-
quired. The probability of a decision after one trial will be P(A) +
P(B), and the probability of two trials will be 1 - P(A) - P(B). Hence
the expected number of trials will be:
(4) E[T/p] = P(A) + P(B) + 2[1 - P(A) - P(B)]
The following cost parameters are assumed:
CT represents the cost of a trial. The figure includes the expense to
both parties of preparation and litigation, including lawyers' fees, as
well as the expense to the state of judges, jurors, courtrooms, and clerks.
Ct represents the social cost of a "reverse" or erroneous verdict, above
and beyond the expenses of trial. This cost will be incurred whenever
the community majority favors A but the jury brings in a verdict of B;
it will represent the harm of convicting a man who should be acquitted,
letting a criminal go unpunished, failing to make compensation to an
injured party, or whatever. It is assumed that this cost is equally great
whichever verdict the community favors-in other words that the cost
of a verdict of B when the community favors A is as great as the cost of
A when the community favors B. 77
C"- represents the social cost of no decision in the case, of two suc-
cessive hung juries leaving the matter unresolved. This cost will prob-
ably be paid in terms of uncertainty and of the chance that the entire
legal order would break down, were all cases or a significant portion of
them left undecided.
Using these parameters, we have then the following expression for
the expected cost of employing a given jury decision rule in a case
where a proportion p of the community favors A:
77. This assumption is clearly reasonable as to civil trials. As to criminal trials, it is
only apparently in conflict with the doctrine embodied in the "reasonable doubt" rule-
that it is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict one innocent man. The
reasonable doubt instruction is given to the community during the trial (which the) are
again imagined as watching on television). Hence if 50 per cent are for acquittal, that
does not mean that 50 per cent believe the accused to be innocent, but that they have a
reasonable doubt of his guilt. Hence the balancing in terms of social cost is made. at this
point, only between the cost of convicting someone who is very probably guilty, but about
whom there is a reasonable doubt, and acquitting someone about whom there is no
reasonable doubt. The balance between innocence and guilt implicit in the reasonable
doubt test has already been struck in determining which of the two verdicts the community
favors.
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(5) E[C/p] = CR'P (result B) + CND'P (no result) + CT.E[T/p]
The first term corresponds to the expected loss from an erroneous ver-
dict, the second to the expected loss from a failure to decide, and the
third to the expected expense of trying (and retrying) the case.
It is instructive to observe how the value of expression (5) varies with
respect to changes in the division of opinion in the community. Table I
shows these changes, on the assumption that the cost of an erroneous
verdict is ten times that of a trial, and that the cost of failing to decide


































































































































































































cost 78 of a given jury decision rule (the columns) in the face of a given
division of community opinion (the rows). Thus if the community is
split 3-1 (p - .75), the expected cost of using a 10-man decision rule will
be .1644. For any given division of community opinion, the most effi-
cient decision rule will be the one whose expected cost is least. (These
78. Units here are arbitrary, but for ease of computation the values of the parameters
have been normalized so that C T+ CR+ CND = 1. Hence for any given set of cost
parameters, one can determine which decision rule is cheapest, but one cannot compare
the effects, in terms of absolute cost, of varying the parameters.
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values are printed in italics in the Table.)70 Thus if p is between .61
and .71, a decision rule of eight will be cheapest, if it is .73 or greater,
a decision rule of seven will be best, and so forth.
If it were known in every case how the community was divided, then
it would be possible to adopt the most efficient decision rule in each
case. But of course a need for the jury arises only because the commu-
nity split is unknown. Hence the most efficient rule for the jury will
be the one that minimizes overall cost, whatever the community split.
Notice in this connection, for example, that although for large p a deci-
sion rule of seven is cheapest, the difference between using a rule of
seven and using a rule of eight or nine is very small. But where the
rule of seven is more expensive (as at p = .59), the extra cost is sub-
stantial. Use of the rule of seven will often prove cheapest, but when
there is an error it will be a very large one. To find the rule cheapest
overall hence requires the taking of an average:80 a lot of small losses
are then, quite properly, outweighed by a single big gain. Thus, in
Table I, the rule cheapest overall is the rule of eight, with an average
cost of .1489, as opposed to .1639 for the rule of seven and .1492 for
the rule of nine.
The foregoing discussion, of course, is valid only on the basis of the
assumptions as to cost made in constructing Table I. But it is a re-
markable fact that for any assumption about costs that is intuitively
acceptable, decision rules of eight or nine produce the least overall ex-
pected cost. Thus Table II sets forth the results of varying the assump-
tion as to the cost of an erroneous verdict. If the cost of an error is
very low (1-5 times the cost of a trial) then of course a rule of seven is
cheapest. But for more probable ratios of error cost to trial cost-any-
thing from six to twenty-six-a rule of eight or nine is cheaper.
Nor is the conclusion much affected by varying the cost of failing to
79. For population splits in excess of 0.93, Table I appears to indicate tliat the expected
cost of a decision rule of eight, nine, or ten jurors is as cheap as a decision rule of seven.
In fact, when the calculations are carried out to more decimal places, the decision rule of
seven continues to be slightly cheaper. The expected costs of a decision rule of more than
seven jurors approaches that of seven in this range because when the community is over-
whelmingly in favor of one result, the likelihood of either an erroneous decision or no
decision is very slight. In mathematical terms, P(result B) and P(no result) approach zero
and E[T/p] approaches one, so that the value of the equation approaches Cr .
80. Speaking strictly, the computation is of the unconditional expected cost, inde-
pendent of p. The assumption made here is that the distribution of p's is uniform. Hence.
E[C] = f. oE[C/pdp.
This is equivalent to taking an average where the number of p's is large. In constructing
Table II, infra, p was allowed to vary by .005 from .505 to .995 in taking the average.
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TABLE II
ExpEcrED OVERALL CoSTs FOR VARIATIONS IN CR/CT
Number of Jurors
CR/CT 7 8 9 10 11 12
2 3156 .3556 A157 .4896 .5707 .6562
4 .2424 .2561 .2878 .3342 .3882 .4462
6 .2012 .2001 .2158 .2467 .2856 .3281
8 .1783 .1690 .1759 .1981 .2286 .2625
10 .1627 .1479 .1487 .1651 .1898 .2179
12 .1517 .1330 .1295 .1417 .1625 .1864
14 .1444 .1230 1167 .1262 .1442 .1654
16 .1380 .1143 J055 .1126 .1282 .1470
18 .1325 .1069 .0959 .1009 .1146 .1313
20 .1279 .1006 .0879 .0912 .1032 .1181
22 .1249 .0965 .0826 .0848 .0956 .1095
24 .1220 .0926 .0775 .0786 .0883 .1011
26 .1194 .0891 .0730 .0731 .0819 .0937
28 .1169 .0857 .0687 .0679 .0758 .0866
decide the case. It is unlikely that this cost will be more than four or
five times the cost of a trial, and it may well be much less."' Table III
shows the results of simultaneous variations in the cost of an erroneous
verdict and of no decision. Each entry in the table is the decision rule
whose overall expected cost is least for the relevant values of CIt/CT and
CND/CT-. Thus for CR/CT = 8, G,,/CT = 0.50, a decision rule of 9 is
cheapest. It will be noticed that the decision rule of nine predominates,
except in the upper right and lower left portions of the table. These
corner regions, however, correspond to quite improbable assumptions
about costs. It seems fairly clear that the cost of failing to decide a case
and the cost of an erroneous verdict will both rise or fall with the im-
TABLE III
OPTIMAL DEcISION RULE FOR VARIATIONS IN COST RATIOS
CND/CT
CR/CT 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 4.00 6.00
4 8 7 7 7 7 7 7
6 9 8 8 8 7 7 7
8 9 9 9 8 8 7 7
10 9 9 9 8 8 7 7
12 9 9 9 9 8 7 7
14 9 9 9 9 8 8 7
16 10 9 9 9 9 8 7
18 10 10 9 9 9 8 8
20 10 10 10 9 9 8 8
22 10 10 10 9 9 8 8
24 10 10 10 9 9 8 8
26 10 10 10 9 9 9 8
28 10 10 10 10 9 9 8
81. The author's intuition in this regard was supplemented by a poll of a modest
sample of his colleagues. Estimates of the value of CND/CT ranged from 0.1 to 2 or 3.
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portance of the subject matter of the case. Hence we should not expect
a very small ratio for C.,m/C6 to be associated with a very large one for
Ca/CT, as happens in the lower left portion of the table. On the other
hand, the cost of failing to decide a case will no doubt remain substan-
tially less than the cost of deciding it wrongly, so that the values in the
upper right portion of the table are unlikely.
These calculations answer the old complaint that the jury uses the
same mechanism in what are, after all, very different cases with very
different considerations affected by the decision. The fact is that, within
a very broad range, whatever the cost of an erroneous verdict or of a
failure to decide the case, decision by a majority of eight or nine is the
most efficient. The coalition and verbal pressure mechanisms promote
this optimal decision rule by making sure that a majority of eight or
nine is normally able to translate its opinion into a verdict.
A word of caution is in order, however. The theoretical justification
of rule by an eight- or nine-man coalition does not necessarily mean
that the unanimity rule should be scrapped and replaced by one pro-
viding for verdicts by two-thirds or three-quarters of the jury.s-
82. Verdicts by a less than unanimous jury are now allowed in civil cases in over half
the states. ALAs. CONsr. art. I, § 16; ALAs. STAT. § 09.20.100 (1967) (five-sixths); ARuZ. CoNsr.
art. II, § 23; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-102 (1956) (three-fourths); Am Co.,sr. amend. XVI(three-fourths); CAI_ CoNsr. art. I, § 7 (three-fourths); CONN. CoNsr. art. I, § 19; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-222 (1958) (three-fourths); HAWAII CONsr. art. I, § 10; HAWUA' REv.
LAws § 231-28 (Supp. 1965) (five-sixths); IDAHO CONs'r. art. I, § 7; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-104
(1947) (three-fourths); Ky. CONsr. § 248; KY. REv. STAT. §§ 29.330, 29-340 (three-fourths);
LA. CODE Crv. ANN. art. 1795 (three-fourths); MICH. CoNsr. art. 1, § 14 (five-sixths); MtNN.
CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.17 (1955) (five-sixths after six hours); Mm.
CONST. art. 3, § 31; MIss. CODE ANN. § 1801 (1956) (three-fourths); Mo. CONsr. art. I,§ 22(a); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 494.210 (1949) (three-fourths); MoTr. CoNsr. art. II, § 23;
Mor. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-5110 (1947) (two-thirds; NEB. CoNsr. art. 1, § 6; NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-1125 (1948) (five-sixths after six hours deliberation); NEv. CoNsr. art. I, § 3(three-fourths); N.J. CONr. art. I, § 9, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:80-2 (1952) (five-sixths); N.M.
CoNsr. art. 11, § 12; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1-1(48). 48(b) (1953) (five-sixths); N.Y. CoNsr.
art. I, § 2; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. § 4113 (McKinney 1963) (five-sixths); 01o CoNsr. art. I, § 5;
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 11420-9 (Page 1953) (three-fourths); Om.A. CoNsr. art. II. § 19(three-fourths); S.D. CONsr. art. 6, § 6; S.D. CODE § 33.1333 (Supp. 1960) (five-sixths); UTAH
CONsT. art. 1, § 10 (three-fourths); VA. CONsr. art. I, § 11; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-193 (1950)(two-thirds); WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § 21; WASH. Rxv. CODE ANN. § 444.380 (1962) (fivc-sixths);
VVIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 270.25 (1957) (five-sixths). In Colorado, Iowa,
and in federal court a less than unanimous verdict is permitted if the parties so stipulate.
FED. P. Crv. P. 48; COLO. CONsT. art. H, § 23; COLO. R. Civ. P. 48; IowA CoNsr. art. I,
§ 9; IOWA IL Civ. P. 203(a).
Less than unanimous verdicts in civil cases are permissible in state courts, since the
seventh amendment does not apply to them. St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Brown, 241 US. 223(1915); Minneapolis 9- St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1915). The recent decision in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), however, would appear to render unconstitu-
tional the practice in Oregon and Louisiana of permitting a less than unanimous jury to
convict in serious criminal cases. LA. CoNsr. art. VII, § 41 (unanimous jury of 12 in
capital cases; three-fourths majority if hard labor must be imposed; unammous jury of
five if hard labor may be imposed); OME. CONsr. art. I, § 11 (unanimous for first degree
murder; five-sixth otherwise). It seems unlikely that Thompson v. Utah, 170 US. 343
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In the first place, the model proceeded on the assumption of an im-
mediate ballot without discussion. Most of the jurisdictions that permit
less-than-unanimous verdicts do so after discussion of the case. This may
distort the results, for the various pressure mechanisms will be operat-
ing. A verdict of three-quarters of the jury, after discussion, may well
correspond to a verdict of only seven, without discussion.
Second, even if it be assumed that the vote would be taken without
discussion, it is not clear that change would be desirable. The present
rules of jury deliberation foster majority rule only to the extent the
majority can articulate its opinions and pressure other jurors into ac-
cepting them. This has two considerable advantages over a simple bal-
lot with an eight- or nine-man rule. For one thing, the unanimity rule
increases respect for the legal process by masking the jurors' doubts and
disagreements, and thus gives an appearance of certainty, precision and
fairness to the system.83 More importantly, a simple balloting proce-
dure fails to take into account the intensity of feelings of the jury. One
juror may be passionately for acquittal, another only lackadaisically for
conviction; a simple ballot gives equal weight to their feelings. When
the majority must rely on coalition and verbal pressures to win over a
minority, the passion of the smaller group may make it stronger than
its numbers would indicate. Strength of feeling will make the minority
able to talk longer and louder than it normally would, so that the bal-
ance of interaction will tip against them later, or perhaps not at all.
Those with strong feelings, moreover, are likely to have loyalties to
groups outside the jury.8 4 These ties may weaken their loyalty to the
jury as a group,8 5 making them less susceptible to the essentially group-
oriented coalition and verbal pressure mechanisms, and therefore harder
to persuade. Coalition and verbal pressure represent the jury system's
solution to the ancient democratic dilemma of how to give play to in-
tensity of feeling when majority rule is the ultimate test.80
(1898), holding that the sixth amendment requires a unanimous jury, is one of the decl.
sions "subject to reconsideration," as the Court said in Duncan. 391 U.S. at 158 n.20.
See generally Winters, Majority Verdicts in the United States, 26 J. AM. Jtm. Soc'Y 87(1942); Barnett, The Jury's Agreement-Ideal and Real, 20 ORE. L. REV. 189 (1941);
Weinstein, Trial by Jury and Unanimous Verdicts, 69 U.S. LAw REV. 513 (1935); :Note,
Civil Procedure, Less than Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 27 N.C.L. REV. 539 (1949).
83. Cf. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148-60, 170-85 (1930).
84. Consider the two cases reported in Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Require.
ment: An Empirical Look, 45 NEB. L. REv. 99 (1966). In one, two jurors held out for
conviction for five hours in a Mann Act case, apparently because they belonged to an
anti-vice organization. In the second, two jurors were especially prominent in bringing
about a narcotics conviction; both had campaigned actively against drugs.
85. B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMiAN BEHAvIOR 329 (1964).
86. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 90-124 (1956).
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III. Treatment of Deadlocked Juries
Equipped with the foregoing model of the jury deliberation process,
we may return to the question of how a judge should deal with a jury
that returns in apparent deadlock. Since only a fraction of juries come
before judges for supplementary instructions, the object of a rational
rule should be to preserve symmetry between juries that turn to the
judge for advice and those that do not. The judge may of course en-
courage the jury to rely on all the methods of persuasion that the law
allows in jury deliberation generally, but if the law disallows the use
by juries of certain methods of persuasion, a judge may not encourage
the use of such a method by a jury he addresses.
The right of a jury to hang is an extremely important and useful
one. 7 The operations of the two persuasion mechanisms, coalition pres-
sure and verbal pressure, define the point at which it is proper and
theoretically useful for the jury to exercise this right. When the mecha-
nisms are working properly, the judge's intervention should be such as
not to alter the results of their operation. But if for some reason the
mechanisms are being frustrated, the judge's task is to make them func-
tion as they should.
We may therefore define a "properly" hung jury as one where the
persuasion mechanisms, working to full efficiency, will not be sufficient
to bring about agreement. In an "improperly" hung jury the mecha-
nisms will be sufficient to bring about agreement, but for some reason
do not operate at full efficiency. The law's aim will be to lead im-
properly hung juries to agreement while leaving properly hung ones
unaffected. Precisely how the judge is to accomplish the task of sep-
arating properly from improperly hung juries will depend on the facts
of each situation. In no case will the judge, even after an examination
of the jurors, be able to say with complete confidence what type of jury
he is dealing with. But for purposes of analysis it may be convenient to
discuss separately cases where the judge will be able to shape his action
87. "[A]s history reminds us, a succession of juries may legitimately fail to agree until,
at long last, the prosecution gives up. But such juries, perhaps more courageous than an)
other, have performed their useful, vital functions in our system. This is tie kind of
independence which should be encouraged. It is in this independence that liberty is
secured." Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5tLh Cir. 19629) (dissent). The
opposite theory obtained, for example, under the old Articles of War, Rev. Stat. § 1342
(1875): a court martial that could not agree was said to have "failed to discharge its duty."
Cf. United States v. Blair, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 66, 24 C.M.R. 869 (1957). But hung courts matrial
are now possible under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, United States v. Jones. 14
U.S.C.M.A. 177, 33 C.M.R. 389 (1963), owing to a procedural conundrum. See generally
Henson, The Hung Jury: A Court Martial Dilemma, 35 M. L REv. 59 (1967).
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in view of the actual situation in the jury and cases where he must act
in the dark.
A. When the Judge's Conduct Will be Shaped by the Situation in the
Jury Room
Of the situations that may face the judge, the easiest is that in which
the jury either has not employed, or has not effectively employed, the
means of persuasion open to it. Here the judge can help most in bring-
ing about agreement in improperly hung juries, while endangering least
the stability of properly hung juries. For a jury that has not effectively
used these devices is-even if not certainly improperly hung-at least
not yet properly hung.
Of the ways in which a jury may fail to employ the permissible per-
suasion methods effectively, probably the most common is the failure
to ballot openly. Both coalition pressure and verbal pressure depend
for their effectiveness on each member of the jury's knowing where
every other member stands, and are thus likely to be more effective
where polling is frequent and open than where it is not. Studies of
decision-making by juries tend to show that minority jurors are per-
suaded at a substantially faster rate when juries take open votes, so that
both the size of the split and each juror's position are known, than
where they take no vote at all, so that only the positions of those jurors
who choose to commit themselves are known.a8 Juries that follow inter-
mediate patterns like voting by secret ballot (so that the size of the split
but not the position of each juror is known) will have intermediate
persuasion rates.
Juries, indeed, appear to have some understanding of the increased
effectiveness which results from open balloting: well over half spend
at least their final period of deliberation divided into such coalitions,
and it is significant that the trend away from secret balloting and de-
liberation without voting is most marked in juries that have difficulty
in reaching agreement.8 9 Hence a judge interested in the most effective
use of the coalition and verbal pressure mechanisms will encourage a
jury to take frequent, open votes, rather than relying on simple dis-
cussion or on the secret ballot.90
88. C. Hawkins, supra note 32, at 100-01. Juries that took no ballots except the final ono
that registered agreement averaged 21 minutes per switched vote; juries that balloted
immediately averaged 12 minutes per switched vote.
89. Id. 111.
90. Such interference is contrary to judicial practice. Standard charges disclaim any
intention of telling the jury how to conduct its deliberations. "You may conduct your
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The persuasion mechanisms may also not work properly when a
single juror withdraws from participation. Verbal pressure, and to some
extent coalition pressure, depend on all jurors' remaining part of the
group. Jurors must take their task and the group seriously, must par-
ticipate and be drawn into the discussion.91 For example, one researcher
cites the case of a single juror who succeeded in hanging a jury, contrary
to what the persuasion model would lead us to expect, by turning the
proceeding into a farce.92 Such conduct, hard to justify even on the
most traditional theory of the jury, makes it extraordinarily difficult for
verbal pressure to result in persuasion. The judge's assistance will be
useful in this situation if he can successfully urge the dissenter back
into participation. 3
deliberations as you choose," the judge says, "but I suggest that you now retire and
carefully consider again the evidence." Allis v. United States, 73 F. 165, 183 (1893); 27
F.R.D. 102-03 (1962).
Popular jury mythology, moreover, disapproves of open balloting. Thus one commenta-
tor argues against takng any early polls, and urges that voting, when done, be by secret
ballot. G. IEMfAN, WHAT You NFJM To KNOW FOR Jm Du'y 40-46 (1969). Yet Lehman
concedes that in fact most juries use either an immeaiate open ballot, or its equivalent-a
"go-round" where each juror states his opinion. Id. 4041. And he disapproves of balloting
for exactly the reasons that it is both permissible and useful-that it tends effectively to
persuade dissenting jurors. Id. 40. Cf. C. Hawkins, supra note 32, at 101-02.
The matter does not come up in the decided cases, since judges do not normally make
suggestions as to how jurors should deliberate. In United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321 (7th
Cir. 1957), however, the trial judge asked the jury whether they had balloted. No objec-
tion was taken, and the Court of Appeals did not discuss the point.
In R. v. Davey, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1287 (C.C.A.), the trial judge suggested that jury
deliberations should be conducted like a "board meeting,' with never a vote taken. The
Court of Criminal Appeal disapproved:
The jurors might also have thought that they were now entitled to regard them-
selves more as being in the position of committeemen or members of a board of
directors, who, after discussing a particular point on which contradictory views were
held, might eventually achieve unanimity in this fashion, namely, that the juror or
jurors who held a view contrary to that held by the majority, or held a view upon
which he was unable to form a concluded opinion, was entitled, as is a member of a
committee or a member of a board of directors, to sink his own view without amend-
ing it or calling for a vote, and to agree with the majority of his colleagues although
he himself was still in a state of uncertainty. We need hardly add that the course is
not permissible to a juror who has taken a personal oath to render a true verdict
according to the evidence.
1 W.L.R. 1287, 1291-92. The actual decision is in accord with the suggestion made here-
since a board meeting is normally not broken into factions-but the court's reasoning is
not. For criticism see Andrevs, Legal Realism & the Jury, [1961] Cu m. L. Rm. 758,762-64.
91. As most jurors do:
[A]ost people, once actually serving on a trial, become highly serious and responsible
toward their task and toward the joint effort to deliberate through to a verdict. ...
Anecdotes about jury frivolity and irresponsibility are almost always false.
Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1062 (1957). See also H. KALVEN
& H. Zs-, THE A macAN JURY (1966). The sociological evidence is dear that the per-
ceived importance of the task strengthens group pressure to uniformity and the efficiency
of the persuasion mechanisms. B. BERELsoN & G. STEINER, supra note 30, at 332, 338-39.
92. "He sang, looked out the window, made jokes, and refused either to talk about
the case or to go along with the majority view." C. Hawkins, supra note 32, at 136-37.
93. People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955), shows how effectively a
judge can act. At 4 pan. on the second day of deliberation, the jury stood 9-3. At 10:40 a.m.
the next day, the foreman told the judge that they stood 11-1, and that further argument
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To be helpful in either of these situations-ineffective balloting or
withdrawal from participation-the judge must be able to learn what
is happening in the jury room. But here the law imposes a roadblock:
very strict rules, especially in federal courts, inhibit the judge from
inquiring into the jury's deliberations. These rules, which seem an
exaltation of judicial ignorance,94 find their origin in Brasfield v. United
States.95 There the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stone,
held that for a judge to inquire how the jury stands is reversible error
per se. The doctrine of Brasfield has been applied rigidly since its pro-
mulgation,9 6 despite the belief of commentators and, it would appear,
most judges that the rule is foolish.9 7
would result in bodily harm to one of the jurors. The judge warned them sharply against
injuring each other; and by the next morning all was well and deliberations were friendly.
That afternoon, however, the foreman reported that the opposing juror was refusing to
deliberate, whereupon the judge told the jury that to refuse to discuss the case was a
violation of their jurors' oaths. Four hours later, the jury brought in a unanimous verdict.
The Supreme Court found no error in the trial judge's actions.
At least by implication, Lord Devlin has recognized the distinctive situation presented
when a single juror has withdrawn from participation. P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 56-57
(1956). While opposing verdicts rendered by majorities of eight or nine, such as
"[r]eformers generally have suggested," id. 54, Lord Devlin advocates different treatment
of the 11-I, or "odd man out," situation. Id. 56-57. But since a single juror able to hold
out against his fellows will almost certainly have ceased to participate in the group, see
B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, supra note 36, at 335, Lord Devlin's proposal amounts to the
suggestion that it is withdrawal from participation that the legal system should oppose.
94. An example of the serious consequences this rule can have is Kawakita v. United
States, 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951), a capital case in which an extraordinarily fractious
and angry jury returned to complain of their foreman and to request a new one. Despite
his obvious concern over the apparent disarray of the jury, the judge's fear of reversal
caused him to avoid any but the most generalized of comments.
95. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
96. In the federal courts, reversal is automatic if the judge learns the division after
anything that might be construed as inquiry. Jordan v. United States, 22 F.2d 966 (9th
Cir. 1927); Spaugh v. United States, 77 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1935); United States v. Samuel
Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1949); Cook v. United States, 254 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.
1958). Brasfield, indeed, was decided specifically to overrule a line of Ninth Circuit cases
holding that the inquiry was error, but did not automatically require reversal. See Quong
Duck v. United States, 293 F. 563 (9th Cir. 1923).
Many state courts do not follow Brasfield. They hold instead that a trial judge may
properly inquire into the jury's division, provided that he does not learn which side favors
conviction and which acquittal. People v. Wooley, 15 Cal. App. 2d 669, 59 P.2d 1065 (1936);
State v. Baken, 293 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. 1956); Reed v. State, 335 P.2d 932 (Okla. Crim. 1959).
Still other cases are ambiguous: purporting to follow Brasfield, they do so in cases where
the facts show that the judge learned which side the majority favored. State v. Middleton,
218 S.C. 452, 63 S.E.2d 163 (1951).
97. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 680-81 n.3 (3d ed. 1940); Note, 41 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1927):
United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1949). The criticism in Dunhcl
was particularly scathing, since the combined talents of Judges Clark, Hand, and Swan
had been unable to find a way around a rule they disliked:
We are bound to say that we do not feel happy over the result, for here the de-
fendants appear to have had the benefit of the most careful deliberation by the jury
and it is certainly doubtful whether in fact the judge's remarks may have had any
effect in restricting or controlling that deliberation. Here was a long and difficult
trial, where the evidence of guilt was substantial, now upset after a seven weeks'
effort for this one perhaps doubtful slip. The defendants, out on bail, have already
had the benefit of extreme delay in making up the record and preparing the appeal.
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Brasfield itself rests on only the most conclusory reasoning, but it
boils down to the proposition that inquiry can do no good and much
harm.
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the
trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for re-
versal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be at-
tained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or
extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often de-
pend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the
trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in dif-
ferent situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can
rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree,
serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon the
jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that
of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge,
should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is
generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned.""
Yet this conclusion is almost certainly wrong. The jurors already know
how they stand. It is hard to see how the pressure on them is increased
if the judge also knows, so the potential harm is likely to be small. And
we have already seen that permitting the inquiry may in fact allow the
judge to do some good and may lead him to discover and remedy a
withdrawal from participation.
B. When the Judge Cannot Shape His Actions to the Situation in the
Jury Room
The majority of situations the judge faces will be less clear-cut than
the one we have been discussing. On inquiring, the judge will learn
that the split is substantial and that the jury has balloted openly for
some time without reaching agreement; he cannot tell whether he is
dealing with a properly or an improperly hung jury. It may be that the
strain of discussion is beginning to tell on the minority; it may be that
they have reached equilibrium and will hold out forever.", The judge's
This case does not make for seemly law administration. But the federal precedents
are compelling and we would hardly improve the situation by trying to introduce
into the system refined distinctions lacking substance.
173 F.2d at 511. A few courts have not scrupled to introduce the refined distinctions Judge
Clark condemned. Compare Anderson v. United States. 262 F.2d 76- (8th Cir. 1959). with
Jacobs v. United States, 279 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1960). See also Beale v. United States.
263 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1959); Butler v. United States, 254 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1958).
98. 272 U.S. 448, 450.
99. Only from the outcome will it be learned whether the jury is properly or im-
properly hung. That is, if the instructions the judge delivers are well-framed, the defini-
tion of a properly hung jury here becomes operational: a properly hung jury is one such
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role in this situation can only be that of a catalyst. His words, though
the same whatever the situation of the jury, should be chosen so their
effect on differently situated juries will be different. Properly hung
juries will feel no effect; improperly hung ones will move toward unity.
Three types of instructions have some chance of performing this cata-
lytic function: urging respect for others' opinions, urging active delib-
eration, and urging jurors to defend their position.
A standard sentence from the Allen charge, urging jurors to respect
their fellows' opinions, assists the coalition pressure mechanism to
work.100
[I]f much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which
made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally lion-
est, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the
majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves
whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a
judgment which was not concurred in by the majority.
The instruction is careful to avoid the vice of some stronger statements.
It makes clear that persuasion is to come about through the effect in
each juror's own mind of knowledge of the size of the opposing coali-
tion. The superiority of the majority's position lies not in any external
presumption but in how minority jurors naturally react when con-
fronted with a majority. Thus the Allen instruction is permissible,10 1
whereas instructions that "the rule is that the majority has better judg-
ment"102 or "the judgment of the majority is superior,"' 0 3 which state
judgments external to the minority jurors' reactions, should be dis-
approved.
If the coalition pressure mechanism justifies urgings to respect the
opinions of others, urgings to deliberate and to defend one's position
are justified by the verbal pressure mechanism. Thus judges often ad-
vise juries that they must participate in the discussions, or that they
should "listen, with a disposition to be convinced."' 04 Such instructions
that, given a well-framed instruction, it still fails to reach agreement. This is analogous to
defining an acid as that which will turn blue litmus paper red. But there is no tautology,
because the test for a well-framed instruction is how it is likely to affect what we have
previously defined as a properly hung jury, see pp. 129-80 supra. A well.framed Instruc-
tion is one that does not alter the balance of a jury that has effectively utilized the
coalition and verbal pressure mechanism.
100. Cf. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
101. But cf. pp. 139-40 infra.
102. Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962).
103. Gideon v. United States, 52 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1931).
104. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
134
Vol. 78: 100, 1968
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries
are dearly correct. A jury whose members do not talk to one another
has no hope of using the open-coalition mechanism, while the instruc-
tion may accomplish some good if the jury is divided by anger or by
the refusal of some jurors to participate.
Of more interest is the instruction that jurors are expected to defend
their positions. Jurors are told that a position that cannot be defended
is an unsuitable reason for hanging a jury. In criminal cases, this in-
struction may take the form: "A reasonable doubt is one for which you
can give a reason." Assuming that the minority favors acquittal and
that "reason" is read to include feelings, emotions, and opinions, it
would seem that the substance of the instruction ought to be ap-
proved.10 5 To require that a juror who disagrees with the majority
articulately defend himself, recognizes that the critical variable in the
verbal pressure mechanisms is the dissenter's willingness and ability to
speak up. When he can no longer maintain his end of the balance of
interaction, conversion will normally follow. Hence this instruction,
by setting the verbal pressure mechanism to work, aids improperly
hung juries without distorting properly hung ones.
C. What the Judge Should Avoid
We have spoken so far only of how the judge may assist an improp-
erly hung jury to reach agreement: our discussion has aimed at pro-
105. Even stronger objection is made that the judge defined a "reasonable doubt"
as one for which, when asked what it is by a fellow juror, "you can give a reason,
then that indicates that it is a reasonable doubt ...." Such a charge, it is argued.
might intimidate a juror by suggesting that he may be called upon to explain his
doubts, although it surely does not require him to justify them. When a similar charge
was first challenged in this court a half century ago, the attack mas termed "hyper-
critical." Marshall v. United States, 2 Cir., 197 F. 511, 512-513, cert. denied. 226 U.S.
607, 33 S. Ct. 112, 57 L.Ed. 379 (1912). But for subsequent judicial commentary, we
should be inclined to agree; the illustration seems to put the point to jurors rather
more intelligently than the usual instruction, half of which defines the phrase in
terms of itself while the other half attempts to explain it by negatives. The objection
that the judge's illustration demands not mere formulation of the doubt but some
attempt at articulation seems, as the Government points out, rather inconsistent with
the "Allen charge," Allen v. United States, 164 US. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 LEd.
528 (1896), advising each of the jurors, at a time when the court knows that at least
some do have a reasonable doubt, to consider the reasonableness of a doubt "vhich
made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intel-
ligent with himself." Later decisions by this court have held that the instruction here
given is "not approved" and "perhaps unwise" but is "not erroneous." United States
v. Woods, 2 Cir., 66 F.2d 262, 265 (1933); United States v. Farina. 2 Cir.. 184 F.2d 18.
cert. denied, 340 US. 875 (1950); United States v. Klock, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 217, 223-24
(1954); United States v. Owens, 2 Cir., 263 F.2d 720, 723 (1959); United States v. Eury,
2 Cir., 268 F.2d 517 (1959). That seems a good place to leave it, especially in a case
where no objection was made.
Friendly, J., in United States v. Davis, 328 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1964). Accord, United
States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 833 (1967): United States v.
Harris, 346 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1965); People v. Guidici, 100 N.Y. 503, 3 N.E. 493 (1885).
Contra, Pettine v. Territory of New MAexico, 201 F. 489 (8th Cir. 1912); Owvens v. Common-
wealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895 (1947) ("good and substantial reason').
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ducing positive actions or instructions. Perhaps more important than
these positive actions are the negative rules that keep the judge from
doing harm. If the judge fails to assist a jury that is improperly hung,
there will be no decision; but if he does what he should not, he may
very well induce a properly hung jury to reach an improper verdict. 00
An instruction that involves some method of persuasion other than
coalition or verbal pressure works with equal effect on properly or
improperly hung juries. Hence it is likely to distort the deliberation
mechanism and, in consequence, the outcome of the case. These in-
structions may take several forms.
1. The Duty to Decide
It is error for the judge to tell the jurors that they have "got to" or
"must" agree. Since a jury is at perfect liberty to hang, the instruction
that it has a duty to decide the case is impermissible.' 7 This casts sus-
picion on the common instruction that no twelve men "more intelli-
gent, more impartial, or more competent to decide" the case will ever
be found. 08 Taken on its face, this is merely a proper reminder that
the jury is selected because of its role as representative of the commu-
nity. 0 9 But it is in fact an "appeal to the jury's pride."" 0 The implica-
tion of the instruction, which makes it inadvisable, is that the jurors
can prove their intelligence and competence only by deciding the case.
In making the avoidance of a hung jury the test of proper performance,
it implies that they have a duty to reach agreement.
2. The Judge as "Expert"
When the opinions of a group or faction are well-established, it is
clear that the opinions of an outsider will have little effect.", Thus a
106. See pp. 129-30 supra.
107. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965). The doctrine of Jenkins was taken a
step farther in the recent case of United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1968).
There the Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge who said, "this lawsuit must be decided
-it must be decided at some time by some jury." The court relied on Jenkins, and on its
view that the statement was not "completely accurate," since "[i]t is conceivable ...
[that] it might never be possible to obtain a unanimous verdict of either acquittal or
guilt." 391 F.2d at 355. But while the statement criticized in Jenkins was wrong, since
that particular jury had not duty to decide, the trial court's view in Harris was technically
correct, since the probability of an infinitely long series of hung juries is In fact zero.
108. United States v. Allis, 73 F. 165, 182 (C.C.E.D. Kan. 1893), aff'd, 155 U.S. 117 (1894).
109. CI. pp. 117-19 & note 71 supra.
110. Cf. Edwards v. United States, 7 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1925).
111. Thus, in a series of experiments with schoolchildren, the experimenter found that
he was able to influence the number of errors his subjects made by coaching some of the
schoolchildren to give deliberately wrong answers. But the subjects' level of error returned
to normal when it was the teacher, rather than the other children, who attempted to
136
Vol. 78: 100, 1968
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries
united jury will do what it has made up its mind to do regardless of
the judge.112 If the jurors need support for their opinions, they will
find it in the approval of other jury members, and the judge's position
will be irrelevant. They will listen politely, but do otherwise. But the
situation is entirely different if the judge appears to join one of the
factions in a hung jury. He thereby lends his prestige to the adherents
of that faction: the jurors perceive him as an expert and defer to him
exactly as they would to a lawyer on the opposing coalition. Once the
judge is seen as a member of a faction, that faction is not confined in
its persuasion of the others to the coalition and verbal pressure
mechanisms. Intervention by the judge on one side or the other
reintroduces into the jury room the persuasion through expertise that
the law tries elsewhere to weed out."
3
a. Comments on the Case or Evidence
When the judge gives the jurors his view of the case and the evidence
before they begin deliberating, he is speaking to them individually and
helping them organize their opinions in their own minds. His instruc-
tions help, as does every event at the trial, to create the initial split in
the jury room. Ultimately factions will be organized around the judge's
comments, as they will be around all the other evidence, but the judge
will not be in the position of having actually sided with one faction or
the other since they did not exist when he made his comments.'
4
As factional deliberation advances, the content of arguments becomes
increasingly insignificant.115 Factional positions will be established on
mislead them. This result occurred despite the fact that the children, questioned after-
wards, admitted that the teacher's opinion was usually correct; they were simply much
more influenced by members of their own group than by an outsider. P_ BE.DMA, Tin
EFFEcT OF GROUP PnaSSURE ON THE JUDGMENTS OF SCHOOLCHILDREN (19a
0 ).
112. Such was the case in all the famous cases of rebellious juries, e.g., Trial of William
Penn, 6 How. St. Tr. 951 (1670); William D. Shipley, 21 How. St. Tr. 847 (1784). as uell
as the now more common instances of compromise verdicts and disregard of instructions.
Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933); Karcesky v. Lara, 382
Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955). The memory of such strongnecked juries is no doubt respon-
sible for views like those of Learned Hand's in United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798 (2d
Cir. 1943), motion for leave to file petition for cert. denied, 321 U.S. 744 (1944). The trial
judge told the jury that the case was "simple" and presented "not ... the slightest diffi-
culty." "[Y]ou cannot," he said, "act like a boy and go in a comer and say. 'I have made up
my mind and that is the end of it.'" On appeal, Judge Hand found no error, and con-
mented that: "A jury which felt itself coerced by such language would have lacked all
independence of mind; would have been no better than a sounding board for any judicial
whisper." 138 F.2d at 801.
113. See pp. 114-16 supra.
114. This point is overlooked in cases such as Tuckerman v. United States. 291 F. 958
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 716 (1923). which simply state that it makes no difference
whether the judge makes his comments before or during the jury's deliberations. Cf. note
118 infra.
115. See p. 108 supra.
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all aspects of the case, and jurors will tend to use arguments as badges-
to identify which side a speaker is on. The arguments become a parade
of symbols, while below the surface the real process of persuasion through
factional pressures goes on. If the judge comments on the case or
evidence at this stage, his point of view on even relatively minor
matters will identify him with a faction, and the influence of that
faction may increase disproportionately. Whether moderate in tone (as
when the judge simply directs the jury's attention to one fact of the
case" 6) or forceful (as when the judge says he believes the case is "open-
and-shut""?7), such comments should be disallowed.118
b. References to the Expense of a New Trial
Judges faced with deadlocked juries often refer to the trouble and
expense of a new trial; jurors are told that they will do as good a job as
anyone else and that the alternative is a wasteful and expensive new
trial."19 Judges embellish this point in different ways: sometimes they
emphasize the pecuniary loss to the parties, 2 0 sometimes the cost to the
taxpayers,' 21 sometimes the loss of time and convenience to witnesses,12 2
sometimes the uncertainty hanging over the litigants. 23
116. E.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); Calcara v. United States, 53 F.2d767 (8th Cir. 1931); Dwyer v. United States, 17 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 756(1927).117. E.g., United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1943), motion for leave to filepetition for cert. denied, 321 U.S. 744 (1944) ("simple"); Weiderman v. United States, 10F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1926) ("no difficulty'); Quong Duck v. United States, 293 F. 563 (9thCir. 1923) ("I don't understand" why no verdict); People v. Talkington, 8 Cal. App. 2d75, 47 P.2d 368 (1935) ("I believe I agree with [the prosecutor] almost absolutely.")118. As has already been recognized, the law is otherwise. Courts draw no distinctionbetween the judge's power to comment on the case before the jury retires and his powerafterwards. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); Homing v. District of Columbia,254 U.S. 135 (1920); United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1943), motion for leaveto file petition for cert. denied, 821 U.S. 744 (1944); Kesley v. United States, 47 F.2d 453(5th Cir. 1931); Tuckerman v. United States, 291 F. 958 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S.716 (1923); State v. Searles, 113 Conn. 247, 155 A. 213 (1931). Contra, Boycett v. UnitedStates, 48 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1931); Garst v. United States, 180 F. 339 (4th Cir. 1910).119. "You realize, of course, that we have tried this case now for four days and ifyou do not come to an agreement this case probably undoubtedly will have to be triedall over again." Instruction approved in United States v. Winters, 158 F.2d 674 (2d1 Cir.1946). The Allis charge contains the phrase, "The trial has been long and expensive ....
where is no reason to suppose that the case will ever be submitted to 12 men . ..more competent to decide it." Allis v. United States, 73 F. 165, 182 (C.C.E.D. Kan.), afJ'd,155 U.S. 117 (1894).120. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962);Logsdon v. United States, 253 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1958); Suslak v. United States, 213 F. 913(9th Cir. 1914); St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Bishard, 147 F. 496 (8th Cir. 1906).121. United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962); Huffman v. United States,297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962); Logsdon v. United States, 253F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1958); Shea v. United States, 260 F. 807 (9th Cir. 1919).122. Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1932); Shea v. United States, 260F. 807 (9th Cir. 1919); Suslak v. United States, 213 F. 913 (9th Cir. 1914).123. United States v. Smith, 803 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962) ("fairness to both parties');
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Such references, like post-deliberation comments on the case or the
evidence, tend to identify the judge with one jury faction. The expense
of a new trial falls more heavily on the plaintiff or prosecution than on
the defendant. In most criminal cases, it will not be the defendant who
suffers from a new trial, but the government. Jurors realize that retrials
seldom occur when the first jury hangs, 4 and the judge rarely points
out that any time the defendant serves before conviction will not count
against his sentence.1 5 Harm is compounded by the indiscriminate
way judges mix together references to expenses incurred by the govern-
ment as prosecutor with those incurred as forum.' 0 The jury is led to
associate a saving of the judge's time with a saving of the prosecutor's
since both are expenses to be borne by the "taxpayer." -
Even in civil cases, concern about the expenses of a new trial tends to
indicate that the judge favors the plaintiff. For the plaintiff will surely
be more harmed than the defendant by the necessity of bringing a new
action: he is seeking something that the defendant now has, or trying
to force the defendant to do something he does not want to do. Delay is
half the defendant's aim.
c. Unequal Treatment of the Majority and Minority
The judge will also be perceived as siding with one or the other
jury faction if he fails, roughly speaking, to give "equal time" to both
factions in his strictures. This perceived endorsement is independent of
what the judge actually says. If he addresses his remarks primarily to
dissenters, the judge will appear to support the majority, even though
what he says goes no further than to ask the minority to participate in
the discussions and to allow the persuasion mechanisms to operate.
This danger is particularly acute in connection with the standard
Allen instruction that each dissenter should examine his views in the
Shea v. United States, 260 F. 807 (9th Cir. 1919) (defendant is in prison); Petcron v.
United States, 213 F. 920 (9th Cir. 1914) (defendant entitled to clear his name; Govern-
ment has right to a verdict).
124. Custom sets a maximum of one retrial in England: if the second jury hangs, too,
the accused goes free. P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 52 (1956).
125. Shea v. United States, 260 F. 807 (Dth Cir. 1919), an exception, drew attention to
the defendant's being imprisoned.
126. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955
(1962); Logsdon v. United States, 253 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1958).
127. In addition to the inconvenience caused to you, your presence here and the
presence of the Court officials has been a substantial expense to the Government.
AU of these Court officials, including me, are here at Government expense.
To say it another way, the taxpayers are making a substantial contribution to the
operation of this Court in the trial of this case.
Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 756 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962).
See also Orr v. State, 40 Ala. App. 45, Il So. 2d 627 (1958).
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light of the views of the majority. Although such an instruction is
proper,128 if delivered alone it would seem to condemn only the minor-
ity's stance. Hence most judges wisely attach to the instruction a
"balancing" phrase, to the effect that the majority should also re-
examine its beliefs. 129 As a practical matter this is almost useless, asjuries are hardly ever turned around by a minority. But the second
instruction does serve to limit the first instruction's effect to assisting
the coalition pressure mechanism by keeping the judge's expertise from
being attributed to the majority.
3. The Pressures of Time
The most blatant distortion of the jury deliberation process occurs
when a judge actually threatens the jury. The use of contempt powers
and deprivation of food and water until they reach agreement are
extreme instances.a 0 Such coercion introduces strains not contemplated
by either the coalition pressure or verbal pressure mechanisms and
should be forbidden.' 3 ' Judges sometimes threaten to hold the jury
until it reaches agreement. Great pressure is applied to the members
of a jury which deadlocks shortly before the close of the day if they are
128. It is only an affirmation of the coalition pressure mechanism. See p. 134 supra.129. E.g., Garrett v. State, 171 Ark. 297, 284 S.W. 734 (1926); Hyde v. State, 196 Ga.
475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943).
There is some authority that a charge that urges the minority to re-examine its views
without imposing a similar duty on the majority is improper. Mangan v. Broderick &Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966); Elkmeler
v. Bennet, 143 Kan. 888, 57 P.2d 87 (196); Acunto v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 270 App.Div. 386, 60 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1946); Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W.419 (1941). But see Thompson v. Allen, 240 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1956), which appears to
have laid down the more usual rule:
It is asserted that this instruction was one-sided; that it over-emphasized the duty ofthe minority to re-examine their thinking because of the fact they were in the
minority; and that it did not equally emphasize the duty of the majority to givefurther consideration to the views of the minority. It no doubt would have been a
wholesome addition to the instruction had the Court also alluded to the continuingduty of the majority to listen to the views of the minority. But failing to do thisdoes not condemn the instruction or constitute reversible error unless it must be
said from a consideration of the instruction as given that it was coercive in that itgave the jury the impression that they must reach a verdict and left the impression
with the minority that they should heed the majority, notwithsanding that they would
otherwise still adhere to their individual views.
240 F.2d at 269. The instructions approved in Allen, Allis, and Kawakita all omit anyreference to the majority's duty to reconsider, so that cases approving unmodified Allen
charges must be taken as rejecting the necessity of urging the majority to reconsider. UnitedStates v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963); Yount v. PositiveSafety Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1963); Kleven v. United States, 240 F.2d 270 (8thCir. 1957); Orton v. United States, 221 F.2d 632 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955).130. E.g., Cole v. Swan, 4 Greene 32 (Iowa 1853) (no food); Pope & Jacobs v. State, 36Miss. 121 (1858) (no food or drink); Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 5337, 297
N.W. 419 (1941) (no heat).
131. As they usually are. See, e.g., cases cited note 130 supra; see also Cook v. UnitedStates, 254 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1958); People v. Sheldon, 156 N.Y. 268, 50 NE. 840 (1898).
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told that they will be required to return the next day, meaning the
loss of work and time and the expense of travel. The strain is expected
to, and often does, result in the quick unhanging of a deadlocked
jury.132
Yet it is difficult to condemn this practice, for a threat to keep a jury
together for a few more hours cannot be faulted in terms of the coali-
tion and verbal pressure mechanisms, both of which become more
effective over time. Indeed, one may assume that, kept together long
enough, all juries would eventually reach unanimity through the force
of coalition and verbal pressure. The question, then, is how long a
judge may permissibly keep the jury together.133
Current legal doctrine says only that the judge may keep the jury
together a "reasonable" time, to be determined both by the complexity
of the evidence and the likelihood of the jury's reaching agreement' 34
We may assume that a jury may in fact need a longer time to come to
an agreement in a complex case than a simple one. But it is not at all
clear that the judge should take into account the probability that the
particular jury he is addressing will be brought into agreement by a
further period of deliberation.
The maximum deliberation period determines how effective the
coalition and verbal pressure mechanisms will be and hence the location
of the tipping point in the jury. The proper location of this point
should reflect the balance between the cost of bringing in a reverse
verdict 135 and the cost of a new trial. The balance of these two factors,
in turn, is determined not by whether any particular jury is more or less
132. With the judge's importuning words ringing in their cars, the jurors left the
courtroom at 5 a.m., and returned with a verdict at 6:05 aam. What happened in that
hour? It is obvious what happened. Flesh overcame will, exhaustion broke down reso-
lution, the legions of sleep conquered the forces of vigilance. The verdict finally
rendered may have been a correct one, but it also may have been an irresponsible one.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 211-12, 157 A.2d 65, 72-73 (1959) (Mu~inanno. J..
dissenting).
133. It should not matter particularly whether he simply keeps them together for
that time, or informs them at some time during their deliberatios that they will be
required to stay for some further period; the pressure induced by the anticipation of
staying overnight is unlikely to be greater than the pressure from actually staying.
134. E.g., Jenkins v. United States, 149 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721
(1945); United States v. Novick, 124 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813
(1942); People v. Goldberg, 110 Cal. App. 2d 17, 242 P.2d 116 (1952); State v. Williams. 39
N.J. 471, 189 A.2d 193 (1963); People v. Sheldon, 156 N.Y. 268. 50 N.E. 840 (1898); Com-
monwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959). A South Carolina statute provides
that, though the judge may send the jury back once for further deliberations, if the%
return a second time he must discharge them unless they consent to further tli-cussionr.
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 38-303 (1962). Consent may be implied, however, and whether it is present
is a matter of judicial discretion. Edwards v. Edwards, 293 S.C. 85. 121 S.E.2d .132 (1961.
A collection of cases on how long a time is reasonable may be found at 93 A.L-R.2d 627(1964).
135. See p. 123 supra.
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likely to reach agreement, but by the nature of the rule of law being
applied. If we assume, for example, robbery and murder cases of equal
complexity, we will want the maximum deliberation period in the
murder case to be shorter than that in the robbery case: the likelihood
of harm from an erroneous verdict is greater in proportion to the cost
and expense of a new trial.
IV. Appellate Review
In dealing with supplementary instructions, the primary task of
appellate courts is to set standards for the proper conduct of the trial
judge faced with a hung jury. Additionally, in each particular case the
court will have to decide if the trial judge committed reversible error.
In deciding whether an error is harmless judges probably should not
consider the nature of the case and the evidence, or at least not the way
they do now. Courts are presently inclined to refuse reversal in cases
where the evidence was overwhelmingly against the complaining party:
any error in the instructions is harmless since the jury would have come
out the same way without it.
Yet the fact that the jury had trouble reaching a verdict indicates
that to them, at least, the case was not as open-and-shut as it appears to
the reviewing judges. The judges are considering only the legally ad-
missible and material evidence, while the jury, as it is permitted to,
doubtless considered a range of other values not formally relevant to
the case. Thus in a prosecution for violation of the liquor laws, evidence
clear enough to convince a judge to a certainty might be disregarded
by some jurors out of a distaste for the laws involved. If some jurors
were led, by an improper supplemental instruction, to overcome their
values and vote guilty, the appellate court should not regard the error
as "harmless," for it has distorted the result and undercut the function
of the jury's deliberations.
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